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1. Introduction 
 
Overview of the literature identifies the following group of determinants of output volatility: openness; terms 
of trade volatility;   exchange rate volatility; fiscal and monetary policy indicators; financial development; 
institutions and country's characteristics such as geography or country size.  The most debated among them is 
the influence of trade openness. Theory and empirical studies find an ambiguous effect of openness on output 
volatility. However, very recent discussion in the literature posits that the effect of openness could be 
moderated through other variables such as export diversification (Haddad et al., 2013).  Moreover, the 
possibility that trade openness may exert an important indirect effect on the effects of other economic 
variables is developed in other strands of the literature. Probably the most prominent is the work of Epifani 
and Gancia (2009), who investigated the Rodrik (1998) hypothesis on the positive effect of trade openness on 
government size. They confirm the positive effect only when a country exports differentiated goods.  
Besides the potential role of the openness predictor, we are interested to investigate whether export 
diversification has an independent effect of the level of output volatility. The theoretical framework provides 
an argument that the desirability of outward orientation from the perspective of output stability depends on 
structural determinants, i.e. institutions and the degree of export diversification. 
Do export diversification and institutions in transition economies moderate the role of trade openness with 
respect to output volatility? And, in particular, do export diversification and institutions absorb part of the 
shocks potentially arising from trade openness? These are the main research questions we empirically test in 
this paper. 
2. Determinants of output volatility 
 
The literature identifies a large numbers of factors that potentially influence output volatility. However, the 
theories of volatility are not mutually exclusive, which impose uncertainty regarding the theoretical model 
informing empirical investigation of volatility determinants. Before the latest 2008.-2010 financial and 
economic crisis, only a few studies had the issue of volatility as their main focus. The crisis opens up the 
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question of how to manage volatility (Haddad and Shepherd, 2011) and, in order to provide the answer, the 
sources of volatility need to be understood. Volatility of output is primarily related to shocks that hit the 
economy. And, in second place, to the structural characteristics of the economy, the institutional 
characteristics and policy responses that can either absorb or amplify the effects of shocks.  
In the light of the global economic crisis from 2008, outward orientation particularly attracted attention in the 
literature (Haddad and Shepherd, 2011). The policy-propositions for developing economies range from 
building internal markets and supplying domestic demand to implementation of policies to promote domestic 
tradable sectors but without currency devaluation (Rodrik, 2009).   A rising number of studies acknowledge 
the risks induced by openness, but acknowledge that such risks are manageable. Export diversification is 
usually proposed as a mechanism that will enable countries to manage risks that arise from trade transmitted 
volatility and reap of the benefits of openness (Eichengreen, 2011; Haddad et al, 2013).  Another important 
factor affecting volatility is the domestic institutional environment (Rodrik, 1998; Acemoglu et al, 2003).  A 
weak institutional environment is expected to create volatility by amplifying economic displacement caused 
by shocks.  
The role of trade openness, export diversification and institutions as potential predictors of output volatility 
are the main focus of our analysis.  Conjoint effects of standard economic variables (i.e., openness and 
diversification) and institutional variables may inform richer understanding of their effects on the level of 
output volatility. To develop an argument, we rely on two groups of studies that relate to our proposition in 
many different respects. The first group of studies  investigate trade, geography and institutions as  the "deep 
determinants" of national output (Rodrik et al., 2004)  and the volatility of national output (Malik and 
Temple, 2009).  However, the second group such as studies by Rodrik (1998) and his successors Epifani and 
Gancia (2009) and Bejan (2006), that investigate the effect of openness on the size of government, stimulate 
us to consider potentially moderated effects of variables of interest.  
The studies of Rodrik et al. (2004) and Malik and Temple (2009) focus on the main effects that our variable 
of interest could have on the level and volatility of national output.  Although those studies investigate 
geography and not export diversification, Malik and Temple (2009) explain that remoteness is connected to 
lack of export diversification. So volatility induced by remoteness may arise from higher terms of trade 
volatility due to more concentrated export. Accepting that export diversification may reflect the geographic 
characteristics of a country, we are interested in the effect of the so-called "deep" determinants; however, our 
focus is their impact on income volatility. Moreover, while the main concern of those studies is whether 
effects from one of the variables dominate the effect from the others, we investigate the possibility that the 
effect of any individual variable is different at different levels of the other two. The second group of studies 
(Rodrik, 1998; Bejan, 2006 and Epifani and Gancia, 2009) motivate us to investigate the possibility that such 
moderator effects exist.   
The second group of studies develop at least two important concepts relevant for our analysis. Although 
these studies primarily focus on government size rather than on output volatility, in this framework 
government size offsets exposure to risks. Accordingly, government spending is expected to influence output 
volatility. Rodrik (1998) associates volatility coming from trade openness with a greater share of government 
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consumption as a percentage of GDP. Starting from the prevailing premises that greater openness is linked to 
greater exposure to risk, Rodrik (1998) develops a “compensation theory”, according to which more open 
economies are associated with higher government shares in national income, which is expected to mitigate 
the risks arising from openness. The argument is that in countries more exposed to risks, government has a 
mitigating role, offsetting such external risks, as the government sector is more secure due to higher 
employment security and relatively stable government purchases. Rodrik (1998) proxies the external shocks 
by terms-of-trade volatility and product concentration of exports. His results suggest that when such shocks 
are controlled for, openness does not seem to have an independent effect on government consumption. The 
openness has a stronger effect on government consumption in the countries that have more concentrated 
export and highly volatile terms of trade (ToT). As expected, the effect of openness is realized through the 
influence it has on external shocks.  Yet, although Rodrik (1998) argues that openness increases the size of 
government, the author does not directly relate government consumption and openness to output volatility. 
This was subsequently done by Bejan (2006), who finds that higher government spending smoothes output 
volatility in developed countries only, while for developing countries no significant effect is identified. Bejan 
(2006) finds that only developed countries simultaneously benefit from higher government spending and 
better trade integration into world markets. On the other hand, in developing countries more openness brings 
greater output volatility, while government will have no impact on output volatility.   In addition, some of the 
successor studies argue that the effect of trade openness is conditioned by other factors.  Epifani and Gancia 
(2009) find that openness is positively associated with the size of a government, but only when a country 
exports differentiated goods (which proxy goods with low-elasticity of substitution). These studies are 
important as they allow that direct effect of openness on volatility could be moderated by the other variables. 
Epifani and Gancia (2009) condition the effect of openness on spending share volatility by the level of the 
elasticity of substitution of exports, while Bejan (2006) moderates the relationship between openness and 
volatility by the level of export diversification.  Bejan also (2006) find that the effect of openness disappears 
once the level of development is controlled for. Such findings may be a reflection of different institutional 
quality (richer countries usually have better institutions) indicating that institutional quality and effectiveness 
could moderate effect on openness on volatility. 
Since trade openness exposes a country to trade shocks, we will explore the effects of trade openness on 
output volatility and the strategy that could be used to moderate such effects. We propose that trade openness 
shapes output volatility conditional on both the institutional quality and the level of export diversification. 
Yet, institutions and export diversification are candidates to be moderator variables, they are focal 
independent variables at the same time. The literature leads us to the conclusion that in a system of trade, 
with trade openness, export diversification and institutional quality on the right-hand side and output 
volatility on the left-hand side, the effect of any of the three focal or independent variables on output 
volatility is potentially moderated by one or both of the other two.  
2.1. Trade openness and volatility: outward orientation re-considered? 
 
Expectation that trade openness increases average GDP growth rates is the traditional argument in favour of 
outward trade strategies. Still, the growth effect of trade openness is not a clear-cut issue, as openness may 
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increase the volatility of a country’s output, by exposing the country to adverse trade shocks. While the 
literature examines the relationship between openness and growth in detail, the openness and growth 
volatility relation has not been completely clarified (Haddad et al., 2013).    
Although many studies investigate the trade openness-volatility relationship (Easterly et al., 2001; Calderon 
et al, 2005; Cavallo, 2008; Jansen et al., 2009; Malik and Temple, 2009; Haddad et al., 2013), openness 
remains the most controversial of all volatility determinants. It is well-known that trade expose countries to 
external shocks (Jansen et al., 2009; di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2010) and that external shocks are a source 
of macroeconomic volatility (Easterly et al., 2001; Kose et al., 2003; Raddatz, 2009); yet, greater openness 
decreases the sensitivity to internally induced shocks (such as domestic demand shortage) as more open 
sectors are less correlated with the rest of the home economy.   
Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) find two possible effects of openness on volatility: while, on the one 
hand, openness is correlated with sector volatility and export specialization (volatility-enhancing effect); on 
the other hand, trade could have a volatility-reducing effect as it changes co-movement between sectors 
within the economy and isolates open sectors from domestic fluctuations (co-movement effect). Overall, the 
sign of the coefficient on trade openness reflects which of the two trade openness effects is prevalent. In their 
empirical analysis on a wide panel of countries at different levels of development, higher specialization and 
sector-volatility effects dominate the co-movement effect, which results in increased aggregate volatility, 
especially in countries at lower levels of development.  
Ambiguity of the theoretical preposition and empirical findings regarding the influence of openness on 
output volatility motivates the question as to whether the effect may depend on some other, moderating, 
variables.  Export diversification has attracted the most research attention (Haddad et al, 2013; Epifani and 
Gancia, 2009; Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008), but the potentially moderating role of institutions has 
also been discussed.   
Export diversification is proposed in the literature as a strategy to manage external shocks.   In line with an 
argument that openness is a transmitter of external shocks, the degree of a country's vulnerability to external 
shocks (including shocks induced by trade) may depend on the level of export diversification. As more 
concentrated exports makes a country more vulnerable, it is expected that greater openness together with 
more concentrated export result in a higher level of output volatility. Conversely, more diversified exports 
tend to amortize shocks, offsetting the negative effect of openness on output volatility.  According to Haddad 
et al. (2013), openness reduces output volatility in diversified economy due to following reasons: first, 
idiosyncratic shocks to specific product markets are more prone to cause large swings in country's export 
volume and TOT when export is concentrated on a few sectors; and, second, there is higher probability that a 
more diversified country is involved in implicit and explicit insurance schemes, which may serve to attenuate 
the impact of external, but also domestic shocks. 
The empirical literature confirms theoretical predictions. Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) discover a 
negative relationship between openness and volatility only when export is diversified.  Similarly, Haddad et 
al (2013) find that the effect of openness on volatility changes sign from positive to negative as the level of a 
country’s export diversification increases. The greater diversification of export should stabilise output, while 
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more concentrated export is expected to increase output volatility. Their findings confirm that a country’s 
openness to trade is desirable from the perspective of output volatility only if diversification of export is also 
a policy objective in the lower and middle income countries.  Their results show that diversification is 
significant for volatility only through its moderating effect on openness, while individually it has no 
significant impact. However, the effects are not significant for the high income countries. It implies that 
those countries have other forms of protection from external shocks, such as developed financial markets. 
Conversely, Bejan (2006) finds that the interaction term between openness and export product concentration 
is significant only in advanced economies. 
Scholars discussed the quality of institutions as another factor that might shape the openness-volatility 
relationship. The literature explicitly recognises the possibility that the relationship between trade and output 
volatility is moderated by governance quality (Bonaglia et al, 2001; Gatti, 2004; Neeman et al., 2008). 
Certain types of trade policies may be damaging when the quality of institutions are poor. For example, when 
quantitative restrictions are imposed, as opposed to tariffs, firms that are connected to corrupt custom 
officials could extract significant economic rents (Bonaglia, 2001). In the case of inward-oriented policies 
with high trade barriers, firms are prone to collude with public officials to get better treatment in exchange 
for bribes.  In other words, if a country has a restrictive trade policy, but a poor institutional environment, it 
is likely that economic agents will engage in all sorts of rent-seeking activities and so distort incentives and 
reduce economic growth. Accordingly, appropriate institutional quality is a pre-condition for output stability 
in open countries. Wei (2000)  concludes that  naturally more open countries (as determined by the 
geography) have more incentives to establish more efficient institutions in order to attract and retain 
investment, because more open economies face greater risk that foreign investors may withdraw export 
capacity and other investments. Montalbano et al. (2005) argue that negative macroeconomic consequences 
of trade in Eastern Europe are related to the weak institutional capacity to limit the effects of trade shocks on 
macroeconomic volatility. However, in contrast to export diversification, the institutional moderating role for 
such relationship remains in the sphere of theoretical discussion, having yet to be investigated empirically. 
Due to our interest in the effects of export diversification, we proceed with more detailed discussion of the 
relationship between export diversification and the volatility of output.  
 
2.2. Export diversification as a strategy to manage volatility 
 
 
Diversification is generally considered as a strategy for the reduction of uncertainty and volatility. This is 
primarily recognised in the context of financial markets, but the same analogy is applicable to other aspects 
of the economy. It offers protection against adverse external shocks by providing countries with access to a 
broader range of global value chains and insurance schemes. A strategy of export diversification is a 
recommended policy to smooth out a country’s output volatility, by decreasing the country’s vulnerability to 
demand shocks and price swings in the global market.  The issue of export diversification is particularly 
interesting for commodity-rich countries. Yet, diversification of exports may be desirable to smooth the 
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effects of volatility of commodity export earnings, although conversely might have a negative influence on 
resource rents in the case when resources are transferred from more to less profitable industries (Massol and 
Banal-Estañol, 2012).  
Abundant empirical literature confirms the theoretical prediction regarding the influence of export 
diversification on output volatility.  Malik and Temple (2009) explain that diversification and ToT volatility 
are intermediate outcomes determined endogenously, while the majority of previous studies consider them to 
be exogenously determined.  They argue that natural barriers to trade such as coastal access or distance from 
major markets result in a more concentrated structure of exports. Fewer varieties in the export base 
ultimately increase ToT volatility and output volatility. Distribution of ToT volatility by group of countries 
based on their level of export concentration shows that countries with more diversified export baskets have 
lower terms of trade volatility. As higher concentration translates into greater price shocks and higher 
volatility of output, export concentration is a possible channel through which geography affects output.  
Empirical studies find a negative but not always significant effect of export diversification on volatility. 
Cavalcanti et al. (2012) find that export diversification is an important buffer against commodity price 
volatility in resource abundant countries. Cavallo (2008) did not find that the degree of export diversification 
significantly determines output volatility. Yet, as we previously elaborated, the trade literature has often 
perceived export diversification to be a moderator variable for the volatility-induced risks associated with 
openness to trade.  Accordingly, interaction between openness and export diversification could be considered 
from the conceptual perspective of openness as the moderator.  
The institutional environment may have implications for the effect of export diversification on output 
volatility, although interaction of institutional influences and export diversification has not yet attracted 
attention in the trade literature. However, an interesting discussion is to be found in the management 
literature. Hitt et al (2006) discuss the moderating the relationship between international diversification and 
firms’ performance (accounting, markets, growth). Among other moderating variables, the authors 
emphasize that diversification-performance relationships depend on institutional environments. Similarly, the 
effect of export diversification on output volatility may differ in different institutional environments. For 
example, if a country has low institutional quality, it might not benefit from access to a broader range of 
insurance schemes provided by diversified exports, which is a channel throughout which diversification is 
expected to smooth output volatility.  Another example is the society with inefficient institutions (such as 
corrupted society) and the access to global value chains provided by diversified export: a country with a high 
level of corruption might not benefit from the possibility to utilise of global value chains if ruling elites and 
corrupted bureaucracy gain no personal benefits. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), the risk of 
political replacement motivates elites to oppose technological improvement as they fear the changes wrought 
by technical progress.   What is more, an incumbent elite may pursue a strategy of concentration in primary 
resources to preserve its position by limiting the scope for political opponents to challenge them (Dunning, 
2005). It is particularly important in the context of our study as primary resource prices are traditionally 
highly volatile and reliance on primary exports for foreign currency to pay for imports may be 
correspondingly risky.  Similar arguments may be used not just for primary resource exports, but may apply 
to any sector that is determined primarily by government rather than by market forces (Hare, 2008). It is 
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more likely that government lacks the information and knowledge on the international competitiveness of 
products and sectors that arises from open markets. This again points to the salience of adequate institutions 
as a precondition for market efficiency. Conversely, inefficiency of certain types of institutions, such as rule 
of law, property rights, and contract enforcement among others, precludes market efficiency (North, 1990).  
However, in a good institutional environment, the structure of exports is probably a reflection of comparative 
advantage and efficiency of production sectors rather than of the interests of the ruling elite. Thus, when 
production and exports are strategic decisions taken by ruling elites rather than determined by market forces, 
it is likely that this will induce a higher level of volatility.  
All things considered, we expect that the (dis)advantage from the level of export diversification is a function 
of institutional quality. We expected to reap more benefits from diversification when a country has better 
institutional environment.   
2.3. The institutional environment 
 
The importance of institutional quality for macroeconomic volatility has been emphasized by prominent 
scholars (Rodrik, 1998; Acemoglu et al. 2003; 2006).  The main point of these studies is that 
mismanagement of macroeconomic policies, which has usually been part of the research focus of volatility 
studies, may primarily be attributed to the institutional environment.  According to Acemoglu et al (2003), 
bad macroeconomic policies are a reflection of poor institutions. The author argues that some forms of 
institutions, such as corruption and property rights, have been recognized as causes of mismanagement and 
instability. Yet, the literature usually emphasises the macroeconomic policies as the source of crisis.  Rodrik 
(1998) postulates that the quality of domestic institutions influences macroeconomic volatility by affecting 
countries' ability to manage external shocks. In this respect, the author find important institutions of internal 
conflict management as proxied by indices of ethnic fractionalization, democratic rights and the quality of 
government institutions. Those variables are considered as so called "deep" empirical determinants of 
macroeconomic stability. While the studies establish that better institutional infrastructure is a pillar of 
macroeconomic stability, the question remains as to which type of institutions are the most influential in 
explaining volatility.  Wide categorisation could identify two group of studies; one that investigate the 
political regimes as proposed in Rodrik (1998); and the other with a focus on economic institutions in the 
spirit of Acemoglu (2003; 2006).  
On one hand, Rodrik (1998) inspired a large number of empirical investigations on the effect of those 
determinants. Rodrik (1999) explains that in a participatory political structure there is more certainty that the 
political elite will reach consensus regarding important economic reforms or regarding safeguards in the case 
of external shocks. Mobarek (2005) finds that democracy supports macroeconomic stability. This result is 
expected, since a democratic regime is less prone to undertake risky political decisions. Political institutions 
are the focus of Klomp and de Haan (2009). They identify measures that capture various dimensions of the 
political regime by applying dynamic factor analysis. The identified factors are grouped into three categories: 
the type of regime; the stability of the regime; and policy uncertainty. According to their results, democracy 
tends to decrease volatility, while regime and government instability (factors of the regime stability) and 
uncertainty of fiscal and monetary policy (factors of policy uncertainty) increase output volatility. Similarly, 
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Guillaumont and Guillaumont (2009) find that high quality of governance is a factor of economic stability 
and among the determinants of a country's ability to absorb shocks. Likewise, Arin et al. (2011) argues that 
the economic crisis should be better handled when country has efficient institutions. On a sample of OECD 
countries, they find that higher level of corruption in a country decreases probability that country will 
successfully consolidate budget in a period of economic crisis. 
On the other hand, researchers focus on the institutions such as inadequate property rights protection or 
enforcement of contracts. According to Rohn et al. (2009), inadequate property rights protection increases 
uncertainty and volatility, since such a business climate encourages investors to direct capital into sectors 
from which it is easy to withdraw investment. They have conducted analysis on a sample of European 
transition economies and examine the effect of institutional dimensions (political/constitutional system, 
market regulations, legal and administrative system, corruption, and infrastructural reform), but find that only 
legal and administrative systems explain output volatility (better systems reduce volatility). However, 
Barseghyan and DiCecio (2010) find that protection of property rights has no influence on output volatility, 
but that entry barriers do have a significant influence. Findings of a direct relationship between entry barriers 
and output volatility could be explained in the light of a dynamic industry modelà la Hopenhayn (1992) and 
Melitz (2003). These authors argue that higher entry barriers allow low-productive firms to survive in the 
market, resulting in more heterogeneity among firms in the industry. Greater heterogeneity with respect to 
business efficiency will increase macroeconomic volatility. Taking a sample of  77 developing countries, 
Malik and Temple (2009) find institutions (proxied by an aggregated governance index, constraints on the 
executive, the competitiveness of political participation and the type of government) to be a very strong 
predictors of output volatility.  Leaderman and Xu (2009) develop a mismanagement hypothesis, according 
to which ToT volatility is a product of low institutional quality.   
We find in the literature that the impact of institutions on volatility may be moderated by the other variables.  
Acemoglu  et al. (2008)  suggests that future research should investigate the possibility that  the causal effect 
between income and democracy is conditional on  some other characteristics.  Isham et al (2005) propose that 
export concentration is conducive to certain type of institutions that reduce countries’ ability to absorb 
shocks. Similarly Van der Ploeg et al. (2007) indicate that resource dependence may amplify the effect of 
weak institutional quality on output volatility.  
We have shown so far that the level of trade openness, degree of export diversification and quality of 
domestic institutions are directly related to the level of output volatility. Interactions between the variables 
(i.e. trade openness, export diversification and institutions) allow for multiple moderation effects. The 
controversy around volatility induced by openness might be better understood if the other structural 
determinants of volatility considered above, institutions and diversification, are considered jointly with 
openness.  Thus, our main argument is that trade shapes output volatility conditional on the quality of 
institutions and the level of export diversification. Overall, in addition to direct links from openness, 
diversification and institutions to output volatility, our theoretical discussion allows for possibilities of 
moderation that include all three variables.  
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2.4. Control variables 
 
The output volatility differs between countries of the similar level of countries openness, which is assigned to 
a whole set of country’s characteristics.  Consulting the theoretical and empirical literature, following 
controls are recognised: 
° financial development and capital account openness (Gavin et al., 1995; Easterly et al. 2000; Easterly 
et al., 2001; Cecchetti et al, 2005); 
° mismanagement of macroeconomic policies, such as fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies 
(Gavin et al., 1995; Fatas and Mihov, 2006; Hakura, 2009)  
 
A developed financial market might reduce output volatility acting as a buffer against uncertainty, but could 
also make country more vulnerable. Developed financial markets and stabilization policies could enter as 
shock absorbing mechanisms that helps countries’ to stabilise output in time of crisis (Gavin et al.; 1995), but 
greater dependence on credit could also increase a country's vulnerability (Easterly et al.; 2000). 
Likewise, easier access to global financial market and greater openness of capital account could help country 
to smooth the shocks adjustment, but simultaneously induce greater volatility. Increased financial openness 
creates more opportunities for risk sharing and portfolio diversification that producers and investor can use to 
reduce risks (Kose et al., 2003; Kim, 2007). Better access to credit, that comes with greater integration of 
country’s financial market into global market, preserve demand during a negative output shock (Aizeman 
and Pinto, 2005). However, the investor could easier pull out invested money in a period when firm or 
financial institution is weakening. In turn, this could further slowdown the performance of firms and 
institutions and potentially intensify economic downturn (Eastery et al., 2000). 
 
Empirical findings are not always robust. Significant negative effect is found in Calderon et al. (2005) and 
Jansen et al. (2009), while Easterly et al. (2000) and Kose et al. (2003) did not find significant effect of 
financial openness on volatility. Some studies argue that direction of the effect of trade openness on output 
volatility vary with a level of financial sector development. Cavallo (2008) relies on Bulow and Rogoff‘s 
(1989) idea that trade openness could have positive effect on creditworthiness of a country which should 
consequently reduce volatility of country’s output. More opportunities to credit access in more open 
economies should help countries to more easily overcome fluctuations in output. The author finds that 
positive effect of openness is more pronounced in countries that are more exposed to capital flows.   
In developing economies poor macroeconomic policies have been identified as an important cause of 
macroeconomic volatility.  For example, Gavin et al. (1995) and Fatas and Mihov (2006) argue that 
mismanagement of fiscal and monetary policy, including exchange rate policy, leads to output instability. 
Rohn et al. (2009) find significant and positive effect of inflation and exchange rate variation on output 
volatility in transition economies.  Empirical evidence indicates that domestic financial development is 
associated with lower volatility (Easterly et al., 2001). 
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3. The econometric model, methodology and data 
3.1. The model 
 
According to theoretical priors discussed in the previous section, volatility is determined by both the degree 
and intensity of the domestic or external shocks that strike a country and the country's ability to cope with 
such shocks.  Therefore, we account for various variables representing both sources of shocks (volatilities) 
and mediators of such shocks. In our framework, mediators are mechanisms that affect the country's ability 
to cope with shocks and could either smooth shocks or expose a country to more shocks.   
 
In our model, sources of shock are proxied by policy mismanagement (such as monetary, fiscal and exchange 
rate policy) and supply-side shocks, which are identified in the literature as the most usual triggers of output 
volatility. Monetary shocks are captured by inflation volatility; fiscal shocks are represented by the volatility 
of government expenditures and shocks arising from the volatility of the real exchange rate. Finally, supply-
side shocks are proxied by the terms of trade volatility, probably the most widely used measure of shocks in 
the literature (Jansen et al., 2009).  
 
The extent to which a country is adversely affected by shocks depends on its ability to buffer such costs. A 
number of factors that mediate the impact of shocks are identified in the literature.  Following prominent 
literature (Easterly et al., 2000; Jansen, 2004; Bejan, 2006; Kloomp and de Haan, 2011), we include proxies 
for trade and financial openness, export diversification, institutions and financial market development in our 
model. Trade openness is our variable of interest.  Theoretical priors presented in the previous section 
suggest that effect the effects of trade openness is ambiguous: a  high level of integration into global trade 
markets, proxied by trade openness, might make a country more vulnerable to external shocks, but less 
vulnerable to internal shocks.   Concerning ambiguity regarding the direction of the effects, the sign on 
estimated coefficients will reveal which of the effects is predominant. Depending on the estimated effects, 
openness variables could be either amplifiers or absorbers of shocks that hit the economy.  Theory reviewed 
in the previous section also hypotheses that a country’s ability to manage shocks may depend on the degree 
of a country’s export diversification and its institutional quality. Here, export diversification is understood in 
terms of product diversification. As discussed in the section we have reasons to believe that the direct effect 
of openness may be moderated by diversification and institutions.  We are particularly interested to 
investigate whether the effect of openness on output volatility differs in different institutional environments 
and under different levels of export diversification. To investigate whether the effect of openness depends on 
the level of export diversification for the group of countries included in our sample, the three-way interaction 
between trade openness, diversification and institutions is included in our model.  In such a specification, the 
marginal effect of openness at different levels of both diversification and institutional quality will indicate 
how the effect of openness changes as the level of export diversification and/or institutional quality change. 
Similarly to trade openness, financial openness and development could enter as shock absorbing 
mechanisms, but could also increase a country's vulnerability. Hence, we hold constant financial openness 
and financial development, the variables that might have a similar effect on volatility as our variable of 
interest, in order to avoid that their effect is confounded with either openness or export diversification. 
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To test for conjoint effect of trade openness, export diversification and output volatility, the following model 
is estimated: 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝐺𝑂𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3(𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑂𝐺𝑂𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑂𝐺𝑂𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 ∗(𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡+𝛽6(𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7�(𝑂𝐺𝑂𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡� + 𝛽8(𝑋)𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑡                      (1)            
     
where the dependent variable, GDPVOLi,t is the standard deviation of real GDP per capita for country i in period t, 
OPENi,t is trade openness (the total trade as share of GDP), DIVi,t  is a calculated measure of export diversification, 
INST i,t    is proxy for institutions and OPENi,t*DIVi,t  is the multiplicative interaction between the trade openness, 
(OPENi,t*INSTi,t ) is the multiplicative interaction between the trade openness and institutional indicators, 
 is the multiplicative interaction between the diversification and institutional indicators and  
(OPENi,t*INSTi,t *DIV i,t ) is the three-way interaction between trade openness, the institutional indicator and the 
diversification indicator and the diversification indicator and 𝛽1,𝛽2,𝛽3𝛽4,𝛽5, 𝛽6  and 𝛽7  are the corresponding 
parameters to be estimated. Xi,t is a k×1  vector of control variables and is the corresponding k×1 vector of 
parameters to be estimated and αi and εi,t are the individual-specific effects and independent and identically distributed 
random  distributed terms, respectively. Vector X includes proxies for the effect of terms of trade, exchange rate, fiscal 
and monetary volatility, as well as proxies for financial openness and financial system development. Note that 
𝛽4 reflects the effect of openness when export is fully diversified (DIVi,t =0) and the sum 𝛽1 + 𝛽4 ∗  (𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡  reflects 
the effect of openness for different values of DIVi,t . Correct specification of the model requires inclusion of all terms 
that constitute an interaction term of the highest order (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). In the case of inclusion of a three-
way interaction, all possible two-way interactions have to be included as well. 
 
3.2. Estimation methodology  
 
The first part of this section briefly reviews methods used in previous studies and identifies potential 
shortcomings and, most importantly, account for shortcomings in the empirical analysis that follows.  
Broadly, we could classify issues of concern as measurement issues, multicollinearity and endogeneity. 
 
Firstly, we are concerned with the measures of the dependent variable (output volatility) as there is no 
consensus in the literature regarding their measurement. Traditionally, statistical measure applied to capture 
this departure is the standard deviation of output, that is measured either by the growth rate of GDP per 
capita (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Bejan, 2006; Cavallo, 2008; Malik and Temple, 2009; Jansen et al., 2009; 
Haddad et al, 2012), the real GDP per capita (purchasing-power parity of GDP per worker or Hodrick–
Prescott (HP) filtered annual real GDP series (Hou, 2010). Hnatkovska and Loayza (2003) and Denbrun et al. 
(2008) use standard deviation of output gap. Standard deviation is either calculated using all data in observed 
period, standard deviation over non-overlapping sub-periods  or as rolling standard deviation over sub -
periods. Usually, variables are averaged over five year period to remove noise and smooth out business cycle 
variation. Rolling standard deviation over annual data has drawbacks, in form of added persistence to series 
(Maddala, 2005) or cyclical pattern even when there are no cycle elements in observations ( known as Yule-
Slutsky effect).    Klomp and de Haan (2009) argue that use of standard deviation does not take into account 
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growth differences, which seems to be problematic as welfare effects of volatility are more pronounced when 
the growth is low. In addition, as growth and volatility is deducted from income, suggestion is that volatility 
should be related to income level. To account for the former, they propose to divide standard deviation by the 
mean growth, i.e. relative standard deviation. Pritchett (2000) warns that cross-sectional analysis of changes 
over time could not differentiate year-to-year volatility from the breaks in growth trend and propose to use 
the standard deviation of the first difference in annual GDP growth rate.  
 
Potential endogeneity is the second methodological challenge. Endogeneity is of greater concern in growth 
regressions as growth rates, current and past, potentially influence both components of the denominator in 
the openness ratio (exports and imports).  Yet, the endogeneity of openness could arise in a volatility 
regression if the government perceives openness as a shock transmission mechanism that causes volatility 
and pursues policies that affect the level of trade openness. Similarly, policy makers can pursue policies that 
simultaneously propose the liberalization of trade and policies that affect output volatility, such as 
privatization and financial liberalisation. An example is the Washington Consensus, which has been on the 
policy agenda in the transition process that countries in our sample experience. On the other hand, the 
counter (political) argument in favour of the exogeneity of the openness variable suggests that trade openness 
is primarily dependent on foreign demand and supply and trade barriers, which are not under the 
responsibility of local governments, but dependant on global/regional decision makers. A further potential 
source of endogeneity could be found in the geographic characteristics of countries. This goes back to the 
argument that small and distant countries are more susceptible to external shocks, but also more likely to 
open up their economies than are large countries. However, the size effect in our estimation is controlled by 
the inclusion of the country fixed effect.   
 
Institutional variables may aggravate the problem of potential endogeneity. The relationship between 
institutions and volatility might be subject to simultaneity bias, as it not straightforward whether better 
institutions bring stability or stability improves institutional quality. Studies usually take into account the 
potential endogeneity of institutions using the following instruments: geographic latitude and the fraction of 
the population speaking major European language (Hall and Jones, 1999), legal origin (La Porta et al., 1999), 
former colonies (Barseghyan and DiCecio, 2010) and European languages (Barseghyan and DiCecio; 2010). 
Unfortunately, there are no such instruments available for transition countries. Hence, there is a preference 
for GMM estimation using internal instruments.  
Overall, there is no strong concern regarding the endogeneity of variables in output volatility regressions. 
Considering this, we utilise different estimation strategies depending on the assumption regarding 
endogeneity. When treating all variables as exogeneous, our choice is fixed effects estimation (FE).  The 
main rational for the choice of the fixed in opposition to the random effect (RE) estimator is the structure of 
our sample. Countries in our sample are not chosen randomly, but by the strictly defined criteria that they 
should be transition countries in Europe and Central Asia. According to Judson and Owen (1997), non-
random selection is often characteristic of   macro panel that usually include the majority or all countries of 
interest rather than randomly select a sample. Moreover, FE estimation addresses any doubts we may have 
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concerning the correlation of our independent variables with the country-specific effects and, hence, with 
respect to a potential source of endogeneity (omitted variable) bias. Both, time and country specific fixed 
effects are included. Taking into consideration the heterogeneous structure of our sample in terms of time-
invariant country characteristics such as size, climate, geography or communist history, the inclusion of 
country-fixed effects should reduce concerns regarding potentially omitted variables.  In the FE approach, 
country dummies capture cross-sectional heterogeneity through different intercepts (Durlauf et al., 2005; 
Baltagi, 2006).  Time dummies serve to control for a fluctuation of output common to all countries in a 
sample in an observed sub-period. The latest global economic crisis is a good example, which makes a strong 
case for inclusion of time dummies into our estimation. In panel estimation, the inclusion of time dummies 
also minimises possibilities for cross-residual correlation (Roodman, 2009).  
 
Econometric requirements also suggest that the fixed effect estimator better fits our model. While RE 
properties are asymptotic, FE is preferred for small and moderate sized samples, which applies in our case. 
An emphasized disadvantage of the FE estimates, that inference is restricted to the set of cross-section units 
included in the estimation (Maddala, 2001), is not of concern as we are not interested in making inference for 
the countries outside our sample. Yet, the Hausman test makes a borderline case in favour of FE estimation. 
The main consideration, however, is that the previously presented arguments favours FE estimation. 
 
There is an argument that inclusion of all constitutive terms increases mulicollinearity, which could inflate 
standard errors and consequently decrease the probability that the interaction effect will turn out to be 
significant.  Practitioners suggest that this is not a credible justification for omission of the interaction term 
(Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003; Brambour et al., 2006) and that the costs of constitutive term omission prevail 
over any potential benefits. Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) showed that, although transformation of interaction 
components could affect the correlation between the interaction term and its individual components, such 
transformations will leave unchanged the significance of the coefficient on the interaction term, i.e. 
significance tests and confidence intervals for interaction term coefficients are the same as where 
transformations are not made. This arises from the fact that in multiplicative interaction models we are not 
directly interested in the significance of model parameters. Yet the coefficients will almost certainly change 
when the interaction term is included; however this should not be taken as an indication of multicollinearity. 
Econometricians argue that the problem of multicollinearity in general (Madalla, 2001) and multicollinearity 
in multiplicative interaction models (Friedrich, 1982) has been exaggerated.  Further, some authors propose 
centring of variables that constitute interaction terms as a remedy for multicollinearity. Kam and Franzese 
(2003) argue that centring does not offer any substantial or statistical improvements. Since potential 
problems with multicollinearity arise when there is lack of information in the data,   centring cannot alleviate 
problems of multicollinearity as it does not offer any new or improved data. Brambour and et all. (2006) 
show that centred and uncentered models are algebraically the same, from which they conclude that centring 
cannot change the statistical properties of estimated coefficients and accordingly do nothing about 
multicollinearity.   
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To allow for the possibility that openness and institutions are endogenous in our regression, we also use the 
GMM estimator to address potential endogeneity. A small sample and an unbalanced panel support the use of 
System GMM rather than the difference GMM estimator for our model. It has been shown that system GMM 
has better finite sample properties in terms of bias and root mean squared error than difference GMM 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998; Blundell et al., 2010). System GMM also seems superior to difference GMM in 
unbalanced panels, since difference transformation in difference GMM could magnifies gaps (Roodman, 
2006), which is of some importance given our data set. The other consideration regarding our dataset is the 
small number of observations. We are particularly concerned with the number of instruments given the small 
data set and, for that reason, we use the xtabond2 STATA written program “principal component” command 
to additionally decrease the number of instruments (Roodman, 2009). The principal component analysis is 
used to minimise arbitrariness and reduce the instrument count. A finite sample Windmeijer (2005) 
correction to the two-step covariance matrix is applied, which makes estimation efficient and robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals. 
3.1. Data  
 
We use annual data over the period 1996 to 2010. The sample includes 25 transition countries (the list of 
countries is in Table 1 in the Appendix 2). Description of the data used together with their description and 
sources are presented in Table 1 in the Appendix 2). Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of non-
overlapping averages of the data.  This is standard procedure in the literature when variables may be subject 
to business cycle variations, which may be the case with per capita growth rates (Haddad et al, 2012).  The 
previous studies use different time spans for averaging, but usually it is done over five or ten years-periods 
(Haddad et al, 2012; Calvancanti et al., 2011), but we also find examples of three-years averaging 
(Mendicino, 2007; Agnello and Sousa, 2009; Huang, 2012). However, all time spans used by these studies 
are, as acknowledged by Buch et al. (2005), clearly arbitrary. 
Due to data constraints, we use 3-year non-overlapping averaging, which leaves us with a maximum of five 
observations per country. All volatility measures are calculated using standard deviation for successive 3-
year periods. Remaining variables in the model are calculated as 3-year averages.  
The dependent variable is output volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita over non-overlapping 3-year periods. There are several factors why output growth instead of 
output level volatility is used. Many studies (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Easterly and Kraay, 2000; Bejan, 
2006; Cavallo, 2008; Malik and Temple, 2009; Jansen et al., 2009; Haddad et al, 2012) use growth rather 
than output levels. Arguments are that the growth rate and not the output level determine the planning 
horizon and as such it is to greater interest of policy makers to maintain growth stability (Haddad et al, 
2012). 
The main variables of interest are trade openness (henceforth, openness), export diversification and 
institutions. Consistent with most of the literature (Easterly, 2000; Jansen, 2004; Haddad et al, 2012), trade 
openness is proxied by the ratio of the sum of a country's exports and imports to GDP. Export diversification 
is proxied by the between and within components of the Theil index and for robustness purposes, the 
concentration indicators (Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI), Gini and overall Theil index). The within 
component of the Theil index measures equality of distribution of export shares, i.e. changes at the intensive 
margin of export growth. The between component of the Theil index measures changes in the number of 
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products in the export baskets, i.e. change along the extensive margin of export growth.  The Appendix 1 
elaborated this property of the Theil index in the more details. HHI and Gini by construction measure 
changes in the distribution of export shares (i.e. changes at the intensive margin) and we expect to get similar 
results as the one when the within Theil component is used. The within component is also predominant 
components of the total Theil (with 81% of the total Theil explained by the within component) and we expect 
that results with total Theil is similar to the one obtained with its within component.   Indicators of export 
diversification are calculated by using the 6-digit level of the Harmonised System (HS) data from 
COMTRADE, 1996 revision, which recorded data in 5113 export lines. Data recorded at 6-digit level is the 
highest level of internationally comparable disaggregated country-level export data 
Yet there are many indicators of institutions used in literature, in our preferred specification we will be using 
EBRD indicator of reform progress in transition countries. Since transition country undergo an 
overwhelming change of the entire socioeconomic system and building of institutions, this favours use of the 
broadest possible concept of institutional quality, which is complied in EBRD transition index.  This 
indicator is used extensively in empirical literature (Kaminski et al. 1996; Havrylyshyn and Al-Atrash ,1998; 
Javorcik, 2004). 
 
Government expenditure is proxied by the volatility of total government expenditure. Andres et al. (2008) 
show that different components of government spending reduce output volatility. Total expenditure is used 
rather than government consumption because total expenditure includes transfers and substitutes, which are 
used as by policymakers as an insurance tool.  
 
Chinn and Ito’s (2008) indicator of financial openness is used to measure financial openness in transition 
countries. The advantage of the Chinn and Ito (2008) measure is that, in addition to capital inflows and 
outflows, it takes into account the extent of capital controls imposed. In our model, the level of financial 
development is measured by the financial depth and financial effectiveness. Two dimensions of financial 
development are observed: financial depth; and the efficiency of the financial sector.  Although, financial 
depth is popular proxy for the level of financial development (Easterly et al, 2000; Kloomp and de Haan, 
2011), financial institutions’ development gains increasing attention in the literature (Roland, 2004; Beck et 
al., 2006). Following Easterly et al. (2000) and others in the literature, financial depth is measured by the 
private credit to GDP ratio. 
4. Main results 
 
In this section model (1) and (2) is estimated using fixed effect and system GMM. Although FE is our 
preferred estimations, we complement these results by GMM estimation to account for the potential 
endogeneity of openness and institutions.   
 
 
Since previous studies assume that the effect of trade openness on output volatility is conditional on the level 
of export diversification only, we start the analysis by testing such preposition on our data and estimate 
model where openness is moderated only by the level of export diversification. Hence, this leaves us with the 
following model: 
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𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝐺𝑂𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3(𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑂𝐺𝑂𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡 +   𝛽5(𝑋)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (2)   
Here, 𝛽2 reflects the effect of openness when export is fully concentrated (DIVi,t =0) and the sum 𝛽1 + 𝛽4 ∗  (𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡  
reflects the effect of openness for different values of DIVi,t . 
 
The estimates of model (2) are reported in Table 1 (fixed effect) and in Table 1 in the Appendix 3 (system 
GMM). Since the measure of diversification is central to our analysis, we report results for the model (2) 
using a range of alternative diversification measure to represent DIVi;t. The results presented in columns 1-5 
in Table 1 are obtained when diversification is calculated using Hirschman-Herfindahl index, Gini, overall 
Theil and its between and within components (corresponding to intensive and extensive margins, 
respectively).   
              Table 1. Fixed effect estimation of the model (2) 
Dependent variable:  Standard deviation of the real GDP per capita growth rates   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES hhi gini theil intensive extensive 
      
Export diversification 16.39482** 15.26429 0.54604 1.35083 -6.42003* 
 (7.234) (37.967) (1.501) (1.266) (3.622) 
Openness 0.09964* 0.10471 0.04976 0.10186* -0.02395 
 (0.052) (0.276) (0.044) (0.052) (0.030) 
Diversification#Openness -0.15407* -0.12408 -0.01085 -0.02186* 0.02635 
 (0.077) (0.301) (0.009) (0.012) (0.020) 
Institutions -1.23803 -0.47169 -0.60604 -1.36149 1.03488 
 (2.419) (2.434) (2.563) (3.114) (1.989) 
Terms of trade volatility -3.07478 -7.75403 -7.42076 -6.85918 -5.48673 
 (7.783) (5.298) (6.068) (5.162) (3.989) 
Exchange rate volatility -0.00145 -0.00119 -0.00106 -0.00053 -0.00071 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation rate volatility 0.00801*** 0.00822*** 0.00797*** 0.00729*** 0.00861*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Government expenditure volatility 0.03773 0.03889 0.03086 0.02713 0.01615 
 (0.052) (0.048) (0.046) (0.044) (0.040) 
Cred. to private/GDP 0.02103 0.02299 0.02535 0.02243 0.01929 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.014) 
Financial openness  0.27308 0.21048 0.25392 0.29424 -0.05881 
 (0.461) (0.436) (0.448) (0.470) (0.291) 
Conflict 1.11133* 0.86218 1.05583 0.80745 0.52422 
 (0.633) (0.679) (0.680) (0.721) (0.711) 
2.year -0.72134 -0.86232 -1.05066 -1.08568 -0.75584 
 (0.566) (0.653) (0.857) (0.655) (0.544) 
3.year -1.72862** -2.04786** -2.19296* -2.13575** -1.91406** 
 (0.717) (0.839) (1.170) (0.882) (0.772) 
4.year -1.69663 -2.13465* -2.32745 -2.24888 -2.03979* 
 (1.143) (1.205) (1.768) (1.450) (0.993) 
5.year 2.68746* 2.27959 2.05572 2.35026 2.69332* 
 (1.434) (1.547) (1.964) (1.698) (1.449) 
      
Constant -4.25400 -8.55411 3.26821 1.58763 7.64249 
 (10.249) (37.603) (12.963) (10.773) (8.618) 
      
Observations 107 107 109 109 109 
Number of country 24 24 25 25 25 
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R-squared 0.58 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.60 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in 
panel data 
0.191 1.861 0.266 0.175 0.109 
 (0.666) (0.1877) (0.6108) (0.6792) (0.7445) 
Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity in FE 
786.06 766.59 758.9 755.4 762.9 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; for diagnostic tests, p-values 
               *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
The result of the FE diagnostic tests raises no doubts about coefficient validity. The Woodbridge test of 
autocorrelation in panel data (Table 2) indicates that there is no evidence of serial correlation. The highly 
significant result of test for groupwise heteroscedasticity, suggests that the variance of the error terms differs 
across cross-section units given the p-value of 0.000 (Table 1). Heteroscedasticity in panel data may arise 
from unequal variance of the error term across cross-sectional units (Baum, 2001), which we expected 
considering the heterogeneity of our sample.  In order to correct the standard errors for this 
heteroscedasticity, the model with robust standard errors is estimated in our system GMM estimates (Table 2 
in the Appendix 3). Considering that trade openness and institutions are potentially endogenous in volatility 
regressions, we instrument trade openness and institutions, as well as all interaction term. System GMM 
utilises internal instruments (Table 2 in the Appendix 3). Referring to Mehrhoff (2009), Roodman (2012) 
suggests application of principal component analysis (PCA) to optimise the instrument set. Judgment on the 
appropriate number of instruments was based on the results of the standard diagnostic on instrument 
validity.3 The preferred results of this procedure combine to limit the lag depth of the instruments on the 
predetermined and endogenous variables to a minimum, which decreases the number of instruments to just 
below the number of countries. We follow the proposition of Bontempi and Mammi (2012), who suggest 
retaining only the components that explain 90% of the original variance. Moreover, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
test statistics is close to or above 0.6, suggesting that sample is adequate for principle component analysis. 
This leaves us with 11 retained components.  The results of the Sargan and of the Hansen-J test on 
overidentifying restrictions indicate instrument validity (Table 2 in the Appendix 3). 
 
The first set of results are obtained by using by the Herfindahl, Gini, overall Theil and within component of 
Theil index as export diversification proxies (columns 1-4 in Table 1). It is shown that the within component 
of the Theil index map into diversification at the intensive margin of exports growth, i.e. captures changes in 
the equality between the shares of active export products. Since the HHI and Gini measure changes in the 
distribution of export shares, it is expected that those concentration indicators also capture diversification at 
the intensive margins4.  As expected, we find the same qualitative results for openness, diversification and 
their interaction when these diversification indicators are used. The results in Table 1 show positive 
coefficient on diversification and openness and negative coefficient on interaction term, indicating that the 
effect of openness on output volatility attenuates as the level of the diversification at the intensive margin 
increases. However, the effect is only significant in case of Herfindahl and the within Theil.   
  
Further, we consider the estimated results involving diversification at the extensive margin (the between 
component of Theil index). Now, openness and diversification have negative coefficient and their interaction 
                                                          
3Testing for residual autocorrelation (m1 and m2 statistics); and testing over-identifying restrictions. Measure of sample adequacy 
of the selected principal components together with test of how well the retained components represent the original data is generated 
by xtabond2 when interpreting the principal components approach to reduce the instrument set. 
4 Note that in our sample changes in the overall Theil are mainly influenced by the changes at the within component (see Section 
3.1). Hence, we expect to get similar results with overall Theil and its within components. 
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has positive coefficient, but these coefficients are not statistically significant (column 4 in Table 1).    Thus, 
we find that the effect of openness is conditional on the level of diversification, but only when diversification 
is measured as a change in the distribution of the existing export shares (i.e.  diversification at the intensive 
margin of export growth). However, we do not find statistically significance evidence that the effect of 
openness on volatility is conditional on the increase in the number of export products (i.e. diversification at 
the extensive margin of export growth).   
The previous related literature (Rodrik, 1998; Haddad et al., 2013) uses only HHI as the diversification 
indicator and do not distinguish between diversification at the intensive and extensive margins of export 
growth, often using the terms interchangeably. For example, it is usually the case that export diversification 
is interpreted as the increasing numbers of export products, even when diversification is captured by the 
indicators which measures the changes in export shares, not in the number of products. Our results indicate 
that it is important to distinguish which export margin is measured by the indicator used in the analysis, as 
the openness will affect  volatility differently when  diversification is result of equality in  distribution across 
existing products or; when diversification arise from  broadening the country’s export portfolio to new 
products.   
The fixed effect estimates of the model (1) in Table 2 predict the joint effect of openness, diversification and 
institutional quality, which is the primer interest of our analysis. The estimation is complemented with 
system GMM in Table 3 in the Appendix 3. Again, the results presented in columns 1-5 are obtained when 
diversification is calculated using Hirschman-Herfindahl index, Gini, overall Theil and its between and 
within components (corresponding to intensive and extensive margins, respectively).  Export diversification 
and interaction term in the FE maintain strikingly similar magnitudes and levels of statistical significance in 
comparison with the estimates reported in the SGMM and since FE is our preferred method, estimated 
coefficient from FE model will be interpreted.    
 
We center variables in interaction around their mean to facilitate the interpretation of main effects in model 
(Aiken and West, 1991). With mean centring, the coefficient on the independent variable represents the 
simple slope of interest when other moderators are at their mean. Centering does not affect simple slopes or 
regions of significance in any way and the interaction plot will be exactly the same when using uncentered 
and centered scores with the only difference that it will include different values on the X-axis. 
              
              Table 2. Fixed effect estimation of the model (1) 
Dependent variable:  Standard deviation of the real GDP per capita growth rates   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES hhi Gini theil intensive extensive 
      
Export diversification -6.78505 -3.98402 -0.52709 -0.80939 -4.70371** 
 (6.066) (13.490) (0.831) (0.603) (2.024) 
Openness -0.02499 -0.01485 -0.02415 -0.02308 -0.00098 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) 
Diversification#Openness -0.13063 -0.14756 -0.01666 -0.01791* 0.11101*** 
 (0.183) (0.422) (0.012) (0.010) (0.037) 
Institutions -0.89919 -0.68568 -0.71973 -0.43250 1.91573 
 (1.884) (2.380) (2.577) (2.809) (1.730) 
Institutions#Openness 0.04391** 0.01644 0.03559* 0.02474 -0.07678** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.031) 
Institutions#Diversification -21.39739** -6.35491 -1.50376 -1.54301 -1.35724 
 (10.265) (46.488) (1.242) (0.972) (2.012) 
Openness#Diversification#Institutions 0.30070 0.59904 0.01315 0.04270** 0.06619* 
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 (0.329) (0.841) (0.016) (0.021) (0.033) 
Terms of trade volatility -0.66598 -7.48300 -5.19199 -3.40237 -7.24886 
 (6.004) (5.121) (5.642) (3.780) (4.666) 
Exchange rate volatility -0.00112 -0.00124 -0.00076 -0.00059 -0.00145 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Inflation rate volatility 0.00796*** 0.00829*** 0.00763*** 0.00788*** 0.00755*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Government expenditure volatility -0.01207 0.02357 0.00100 -0.00046 0.03059 
 (0.044) (0.052) (0.049) (0.044) (0.045) 
Cred. to private/GDP 0.02267 0.02894* 0.03359* 0.01881 0.02457* 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012) 
Financial openness  0.36281 0.24185 0.40251 0.23724 -0.17167 
 (0.413) (0.453) (0.434) (0.439) (0.293) 
Conflict 1.16194* 0.83418 1.17731* 0.94678 0.38928 
 (0.676) (0.680) (0.621) (0.730) (0.641) 
2.year -0.43408 -0.73904 -0.74113 -0.68640 -1.28874* 
 (0.489) (0.660) (0.780) (0.530) (0.748) 
3.year -1.48938** -1.92266** -1.79724 -1.78517* -2.25931** 
 (0.677) (0.869) (1.153) (0.872) (0.889) 
4.year -1.84062* -2.20750 -2.21509 -2.11435 -2.18357** 
 (1.058) (1.341) (1.693) (1.435) (1.023) 
5.year 2.75435* 2.19899 2.20404 2.54234 2.04194 
 (1.417) (1.567) (1.810) (1.687) (1.429) 
      
Constant 2.83854*** 2.82645*** 3.10570*** 3.12569*** 3.48382*** 
 (0.567) (0.772) (0.780) (0.722) (0.821) 
      
Observations 107 107 109 109 109 
Number of country 24 24 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.61 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.64 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in 
panel data 
0.801 0.253 0.175 0.115 0.23 
 (0.3801) (0.6123) (0.6792) (0.7245) (0.6001) 
Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity in FE 
1574.71 1570.16 1424.20 1710.35 1554.21 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                Robust standard errors in parentheses; for diagnostic tests, p-values 
               *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
                                   
The result of the FE diagnostic tests (The Woodbridge test of autocorrelation in panel and test for groupwise 
heteroscedasticity in Table 2) and system GMM ( Hansen, Sargan and tests of adequacy of principal 
components in Table 3 in the Appendix 3)  raises no doubts about coefficient validity. Considering that trade 
openness and institutions are potentially endogenous in volatility regressions, we instrument trade openness 
and institutions, as well as all interactions in which these variables appear.  Since openness and institutions 
are constituents of each interaction terms included in model (1), all interactions are treated as potentially 
endogenous and instrumented together with the focal variables. Simple slope evidence from FE and GMM 
estimation are very similar for the observed level of moderators and for sake of presentational simplicity only 
FE estimates will be presented here. 
                          
The three-way interaction of trade openness, diversification and institutions is not significant in case of 
diversification at the intensive export margin (columns 1-4 in Table 3), while it is significant when 
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diversification at the extensive margin is included (column 5 in Table 3). This means that openness, 
diversification and institutions jointly determine output volatility, when country diversifies export by 
increasing the number of export products. However, when diversification is observed in terms of changes in 
export shares, than openness and diversification has joint effect on volatility, independently of the 
institutional quality.  
 
The estimated coefficient on the three-way interaction (Openness#Extensive#Institutions in Table 5) measures 
the impact of a joint increase of OPENNESS, DIV and CORRUPT on GDPvol.  The coefficient on the 
interaction term itself reveals only the magnitude of the particular effect of some variable of interest when 
the other constitutive variables are equal zero.  Next, we interpret the openness slope, which reflects the 
effect of openness moderated by the export diversification and institutions. 
 
The marginal effect of openness in model (1) is calculated as: 
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑖𝜕𝑡𝑖𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
= 𝛽2 + 𝛽4(𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7(𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡               (3)                                                                
with variance     
𝜎�𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝐺𝑣𝑣�?̂?1� +  (𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡2  𝐺𝑣𝑣�?̂?4� + (𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡2  𝐺𝑣𝑣�?̂?5� +  (𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡2 (𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡2  𝐺𝑣𝑣�?̂?7� +2(𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝛽1𝛽4) + 2(𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝛽1𝛽5) + 2(𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡(𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝛽1𝛽7) +2(𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡 (𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝛽4𝛽5) +  2(𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡(𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡2 𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝛽4𝛽7) + 2(𝐺𝐷𝐷)𝑖,𝑡(𝐷𝑂𝐼𝐼)𝑖,𝑡2 𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝛽5𝛽7)           (4) 
 
This implies that the effect of a change in openness on volatility depends on the values of the conditioning 
variables DIV and INST, as well as on the estimated coefficient of openness (𝛽2). It is easily to deduce from 
expression (3) that the estimated coefficient on openness (openness in Table 2 and  in model (1)) in the 
uncentred model would illustrate effect of openness on volatility but only when DIV=INST=0. However, this 
is irrelevant in our case, because there are no observations (countries) that are perfectly diversified or with an 
institutional indicator of zero. Note that this is often the case, not just in our particular sample, as they are not 
variable of direct interest. This helps us to understand why model specification with a three-way interaction 
term must include also each two-way interactions as well as each primary focal variable. Otherwise, the 
estimated slope applies only to highly restricted circumstances, which might not be represented in the sample 
(Brambourg et al., 2006). Similarly, the standard errors related to the coefficient would be standard errors 
only for that particular effect. It is evident from expression (4) that the standard errors on the individual 
coefficient should differ at different levels of diversification and institutions. Moreover, with mean centring, 
the openness coefficient reported in table 2 indicates that openness has no statistically significant effect on 
volatility when diversification and institutions are at their mean values. However, the marginal effects could 
reveal effects different from the regression coefficients. This implies that the effect of a change in openness 
on volatility depends on the values of the conditioning variables diversification and institutions. So, when a 
three-way interaction is part of the model, the conclusion we draw only from the coefficients on individual 
variables and on two-way interaction could be misleading. It is suggested that only the three-way interaction 
should be interpreted in that case.  
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In the same vein, the coefficient on export diversification has a significant negative effect on output volatility 
when a country has the mean level of openness and institutional quality, but this may or may not be the case 
for other values of openness and institutions. The coefficient on institutions has a non-significant effect on 
output volatility when diversification and openness take their mean values in the sample, but this may or may 
not be the case for other values of openness and diversification. Hence, it would be misleading to comment 
only the individual coefficients on openness, diversification and institutions.  
 
We cannot infer whether openness, diversification and institutions have any relevant and significant 
conditional effect on volatility from the magnitude and significance on the interaction terms alone. Only the 
sign of the interaction term is informative. However, the sign should indicate only the average direction of 
the effect of the focal independent variables on volatility as the conditional variables increase, but not 
whether this effect is uniformly positive or negative.  Yet, the interaction coefficient from the regression 
output provides us with limited understanding of our research questions. To obtain more informative 
interpretation, the marginal effect of diversification/openness across the values of diversification other than 
zero will be presented.  
 
In sum, the interaction coefficient from the regression output provides us with limited understanding of our 
research questions as it reveals only the magnitude of the particular effect of some variable of interest when 
the other constitutive variables are at their mean levels.  To obtain a more informative interpretation, the 
marginal effect of one variable in interaction will be interpreted across the values of the moderators other 
than the mean. The most informative approach to investigate the three-way interaction is graphical 
presentation of the linear predictions (adjusted margin plot) and simple slope of the variable of interest when 
the moderator variables are held constant at different levels of interest. Adjusted margin plots along with a 
scatterplot of the observations help to more easily understand the nature of the interaction effect, while 
calculation and plotting of simple slopes reveal the size and significance of the interaction effect.  Since there 
is no theoretically suggested level of diversification and institutions of particular interest, for the sake of 
presentational convenience we follow the Aiken and West (1991) proposition to present the marginal effect 
at low and high levels of the moderator variables. In our case, the 1st quartile represents a low level and the 
3rd quartile represents a high level of each moderator and simple slopes will be the slopes of the dependent 
variable on the independent variable when the moderator variables are held constant at different 
combinations of high and low values.   Further, we conducted tests to determine whether the simple slopes 
are statistically different from each other (Dawson and Richter, 2006). However, these results have to be 
interpreted with caution, because slope difference tests have very low power unless the sample size is quite 
large (Dawson and Richter, 2006). In order to correct for multiple comparisons, the Bonferroni method is 
applied to adjust the p-values to take into account that these are post-hoc tests. 
 
First, adjusted margins plots are used to identify simple effects for each variable of interest and all potential 
interactions. When we inspect the three-way interaction, the main effect of the variable of interest exists if 
the average value of the dependent variable is different at different levels of the independent variables. The 
two-way interactions (for example openness-diversification) exist if the simple effect of one variable on the 
dependent variable in interaction is different at different levels of the other variable, or vice versa. A plot of 
the data will show non-parallel lines. Finally, the three-way interaction exists if the two-way interaction 
changes as we change the level of some third variable. The possibilities are two different two-way 
interactions; or one two-way interaction in one case and no two-way interaction in the other case.    
   
First, we plot the slope of observations across the full range of trade openness. Figure 1 shows interactions   
between openness and institutions predicting output volatility for countries with concentrated and   
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diversified export at the extensive margin. Note here that fitted negative values of dependent variable do not 
reflect data in the sample (figure 1), but are the results of linear fitting of a simple slope (in both panels in 
figure 1 there are no negative observations). 
 
Figure 1. Adjusted margin of openness as a function of diversification (separate panels) and institutional  quality   
                (separate lines) , predictive margins with 90% CIs 
  
Source:  Author's illustration 
 
Figure 1 shows that the openness-institution interaction differs for different levels of diversification.  
Although in both graphs the lines crossover, the direction of the lines differs. More openness results in 
greater volatility when export is diversified and in lower volatility when export is concentrated. That is, the 
two-way institutions-openness interaction for countries with diversified export is different from the two-way 
institutions-openness interaction for countries with concentrated export. Since a three-way interaction is a 
change in the two way interaction as the level of the third variable changes, Figure 1 shows that there might 
be a three-way interaction of trade openness, export diversification and volatility.  
 
For concentrated export and lower openness, countries with  better institutions has higher  volatility than 
those with lower level of institutional quality, whereas for those with concentrated export and high  
openness,  countries  with low institutional quality  have higher  volatility scores than those with better 
institutions. While this doesn’t seem to make much sense, from the scatterplot we see that only a few 
observation combine low openness and good institutions, which does not make convincing evidence that 
better institutions are associated with volatility when openness is low. In countries with diversified exports, 
the effect of openness is statistically significant when openness is above about 110% of GDP (which 
accounts for 47% observations with high diversification) and countries always have lower volatility when 
institutions are better. For countries with concentrated export, adjusted margins show that openness has a 
statistically significant effect when the country is in the lower tail of openness distribution (up to about 120% 
of GDP). Thus, once openness is sufficiently high, more trade openness does not affect volatility when 
export is concentrated. 
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Next, trade openness simple slopes across a substantively meaningful range of the modifying variables are 
presented in Figure 3. 
               Figure 3. Average marginal effects of openness as a function of  diversification(x-axis) and   
                               institutional quality (separate lines) 
 
                            Source:  Author's illustration 
 
Figure 3 indicates that openness reduces the volatility when export is highly concentrated (divers<0.9 or 24 
% of observations) and increases volatility when export is highly diversified (divers<1.8 or 40% of 
observations).  The openness slope is steeper when institutional quality is high, indicating that openness 
reduces volatility more rapidly when institutions are better. 
 
To quantify evidence in Figures 2 and 3, the value of simple openness slopes are estimated at the low/high 
levels of the moderator variables. Table 3 presents estimates of marginal effects, which are the slopes of the 
linear effects displayed in Figure 2 and average marginal effect in Figure 3, together with pairwise 
comparisons (in each case, the null is no significant differences). 
 
           Table 3. Average marginal effects of openness at different levels of diversification and institutions    
                          after   FE estimation 
 FE robust 
 Marginal effect Pairwise comparison 
Diversification/ 
Institutional quality* 
Openness 
slope 
St.dev p-value at Contrast St.dev p-
value 
1. Concentration/ 
    Weak institutions -0.0165 0.019 0. 384 2 vs. 1 -0.067 0.024 0.034 
2.Concentration / 
    Strong institutions -0.0833 0.024 0.022 3 vs. 1 0.078 0.027 0.022 
3. Diversification/ 
    Weak institutions         0.0617 0.031 0.044 4 vs. 2 0.116 0.021    0.01 
4. Diversification/ 
    Strong institutions 0.0333 0.02 0.087 4 vs. 3 -0.0284 0.019 0.83 
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The pairwise comparisons reported above reveal that institutional quality only exerts a significant moderating 
effect on the openness among countries with concentrated export, while effect of openness is not conditional 
on institutions in countries with diversified export. For countries with concentrated exports (rows 1 and 2 in 
Table 3), openness is negatively related to volatility when institutions are good (β=-0.083, p =0.022 in the 
row 2) and is not significantly related to volatility in weak institutional regimes (β=-0.016, p =0.384 in the 
row 1). Pairwise comparison of those openness slopes shows that the effect of openness differs in different 
institutional environment when exports are concentrated (t=-0.067; p=0.034; 2 vs 1. in pairwise comparisons 
in table). For countries with diversified exports ( rows 3 and 4 in Table 3) openness is positively related to 
volatility when export is diversified, with slopes being economically and statistically more significant in 
weaker institutional environment  (β=0.062, p =.0044 in the row 3) than in  a better one (β=0.034, p =0.082 
in the row 4). However, pairwise comparison show no statistically significant difference between slopes (t= -
0.0284; p=0.83; 4 vs 3 in Table 3), indicating that institutions do not moderate the effect of openness when 
countries are diversified  
 
The effect of openness is moderated by the level of export concentration regardless of the quality of 
institutional environment. Pairwise comparison (3 vs.1) in Table 3 show the openness slope when export is 
diversified and institutions are strong differs significantly from the openness slope when export is diversified 
and institutions are weak  (t=0.078; p=0.022 in Table 3).  Similarly, pairwise comparisons of the slopes (4 vs. 
2) in Table 3 indicate that the openness slopes in countries with concentrated export, but different 
institutional environment, significantly differs from each other (t=0.116; p=0.01 in Table 3).  Overall, the 
results show that the effect of openness is moderated by the level of export diversification and institutional 
quality. Greater trade openness tends to increase volatility as the number of exported products increase, with 
effect being similar in countries with different institutional quality. If a country's export at the extensive 
margin is concentrated (i.e. small entrepreneurship), country will benefit from trade, especially if institutions 
are good.  
Next, figure 4 shows interactions between openness and diversification predicting output volatility for 
countries with weak and strong institutional quality across the full range of export diversification. 
 
                 Figure 4. Adjusted margin of openness as a function of diversification (separate panels) and   
                                institutional quality (separate lines), predictive margins with 90% CIs 
 
                  Source:  Author's illustration 
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The adjusted margins in Figure 4 show that increasing diversification cause stronger reaction of output 
volatility in less open than in more open countries.  Institutions does not seems to moderate the 
diversification effect on volatility in neither closed nor open countries. Average changes in the diversification 
slopes are depicted by the average marginal effect of export diversification across a substantively meaningful 
range of openness in Figure 5. 
 
                  Figure 5. Average marginal effects of diversification as a function of openness (x-  
                                axis)   and  institutional quality (separate lines)  
       
                               Source:  Author's illustration 
 
The Figure 5 suggests that an increase in diversification has a negative effect on the volatility, but significant 
only when openness is lower than 105% of gdp (right-hand side panel in figure 5). It turn out that less than 
70% of the sample fall into required level of significance, which is compelling evidence for claim that 
magnitude of the diversification effect decrease with the level of openness, up to sufficiently enough level of 
openness (around 105% of gdp) above which diversification has no statistically significant effect. Average 
marginal effect of diversification at low/high level of openness and institutions calculated in Table 4 quantify 
what we see in Figure 5. The results in Table 4 show that diversification reduces volatility when country has 
low openness (rows 1 and 2) and no significant when openness is high (rows 3 and 4).  Pairwise comparisons 
in Table 4 show that diversification slopes for low/high openness significantly differs from each other in 
weak (3 vs. 1) and strong institutional regimes (4 vs. 2) . 
 
Figure 3 shows almost overlapping average marginal effect of diversification for low and high institutional 
quality, indicating that institutions do not make significant differences for the effect of diversification 
conditional on openness is expected. The pairwaise comparisons in Table 4 confirm that diversification effect 
on volatility does not significantly differ at low/high institutional quality. In Table 4, the pairwise 
comparisons of diversification slopes at low/high institutions do not find significant difference between when 
the openness is low (2 vs. 1);  nor when the openness is high (4 vs. 3). 
  
           Table 4. Average marginal effects of diversification at different levels of openness and institutions    
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          after    FE estimation 
 FE robust 
 Marginal effect Pairwise comparison 
Openness/ 
institutional quality* 
Diversification 
slope 
St.dev p-value at Contrast St.dev p-
value 
1. Low openness/ 
    Weak institutions         -6.343 2.42 0.009 2 vs. 1 -1.88   1.728   1.00 
2. Low openness/ 
    Strong institutions -8.223 2.92 0.005 3 vs. 1 4.316 1.425 0.002 
3. High openness / 
    Weak institutions -2.201 2.385 0. 356 4 vs. 2 6.195 2.005 0.012 
4. High openness / 
    Strong institutions -2.026 2.74 0.46 4 vs. 3 0.174 1.24 1.00 
 
Diversification is beneficial when country is less open and is not associated with volatility when openness is 
high. The institutional quality does not make any significant differences in both cases.  In other words, 
diversification-openness interaction is not conditional on institutional quality. However, diversification-
institutions interaction is significantly conditional on the level of country's openness.    
 
We find that when export diversification at the intensive margin (i.e. changes in distribution of export shares) 
is observed, than the effect of openness is conditional on the export diversification only. The results show 
that the effect of openness on volatility reduces as country has more equal distribution of export shares across 
product exported. Such finding corresponds to the evidence found in the previous literature (Rodrik, 1998; 
Epifani and Gancia, 2009 and Haddad et al, 2013).  
 
However when diversification is measured at the extensive margin (i.e, when change in the number of export 
products), we find that trade openness, export diversification at the extensive margin and institutional quality 
jointly affect output volatility in transition countries. Analysis of marginal effect reveals that both, export 
structure and institutions, moderate the effect that exposure to trade has on output volatility. Openness has a 
pervasive effect for different levels of diversification, resulting in a greater stability of output if exports are 
concentrated on a few products and greater instability if country's export basket is fairly diversified.  When 
country has export basket concentrated on a few products, trade openness is significantly more beneficial 
when institutions are better. However,   when export basket is diversified, the effect of openness is similar in 
different institutional environment. Greater number of product in export basket appears to reduce output 
volatility, but having significantly more success in less open than in more open countries. Institutions do not 
play any significant role for the effect of diversification.  The results of our analysis provide the evidence that 
increasing number of export products is an effective strategy for output volatility reduction, especially in less 
open economies. Flipping the story from the angle of trade openness, we found that in transition countries 
more openness is beneficial only if country export a few products and have good institutions. Otherwise, 
when number of products increases, more openness may result in more volatility, especially when 
institutions are poor. Institutions do not appear as a prime mover of volatility, but it influences how the 
reaction of output to increasing trade. 
 
Empirical literature did not investigate the effect of openness conditional on the diversification at different 
margins of export growth. In the previous similar studies, export diversification is measured by the 
concentration indices (usually by the Herfindahl index only), which measures changes at the export shares 
(i.e. intensive margin). However, diversification calculated by the concentration indices is often interpreted 
as a change in number of export products, which is not conceptually correct. Our findings that the trade 
27 
 
openness has different effect on volatility when country diversifies exports along the extensive that when 
export is diversified along the intensive margin show that differences between diversification at the export 
margins are not just conceptual, but also substantive. 
 
Evidence on the volatility-enhancing effect of openness when country increase the number of export products 
in transition economies  should be interpreted taking into consideration specificity of the economics in 
transition, which experience remarkable external and internal shocks in the beginning of the 90s. External 
shock results in major fundamental changes of their external trade, while internal shocks cause changes in the 
resource allocation and institutions.  Considering very short period of time from beginning of transition, we 
could expect that exporters are still finding right mode of their presence at the external markets. This is along 
the line with Besedes's (2011) findings on increased hazard of transition country's export that is a 
consequence of their increased participation in international trade. Moreover, Besedes (2011) find that hazard 
of exporting over time increased the most for differentiated goods and that mostly richer transition 
economies (such as Czech Republic or Slovenia) reoriented trade towards differentiated goods at expense  of 
the other type of goods. The richer economies in Besedes(2011) sample are the most diversified in our 
sample, which implies that churning could explain volatility-enhancing effect of openness in diversified 
countries. In addition, such evidence may indicate that too many different products may not form large, 
internationally competitive industries, which may reduce probability for domestic producer to successfully 
participate on the global market.  These new exporters are usually not the most efficient once, since in 
transition context, given limited opportunities at the home market, firms are pushed into export market. Also, 
these are small economies with limited potential to exploit economies of scale which may result in a high 
cost of moving into many new products (Papageorgiou and Spatafora, 2012). On the other hand, volatility-
reducing effect of openness when country is concentrated could be reflection of exporters with monopolistic 
competition and market power (Buch 2002).   
Variables that proxy for shocks that hit the economy such as volatility of terms of trade, inflation, exchange 
rate and government expenditure  do not exhibit significant  effects. Similar to Acemoglu et al. (2003), we 
find that institutions are significant but also shocks that arise from mismanagement of macroeconomic 
policies (such as inflation or exchange rate) are not. In Acemoglu et al. (2003), this most likely indicates that 
the effect of institutions is not mediated by macroeconomic policies, but by other, possibly microeconomic 
policies. Acemoglu et al. (2003) hypothesis that the effect of macroeconomic mismanagement is probably a 
reflection of a weak institutional environment, i.e. weak institutions may create macroeconomic problems 
and exert negative effects on volatility through a range of macroeconomic and microeconomic channels. 
 
Financial development appears to be a very important element in the explanation of output volatility in the 
transition economies of Europe and Central Asia. Progress in the institutional development of the financial 
sector tends to reduce the volatility of output in transition economies, while the effect of the level of 
credit/GDP is ambiguous and, in the case of high dependency on credit, it could make a country more 
vulnerable. Turning to the regression results in our analysis (table 2), a very similar proposition is suggested. 
The index of progress in the reform of the financial sector, which proxies for the efficiency of financial 
development, is statistically significant across all specifications (Table 2). As expected, progress in 
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institutional environment of the financial market tends to reduce output and is highly statically significant 
across all specifications. On the other hand, credit to the private sector is statistically significant only in FE 
estimation (Table 2).  However, the sign on the financial depth proxy is positive, suggesting that the greater 
the level of credit/GDP the greater the output volatility. It is likely that a high credit ratio makes a country 
dependent and exposes it to greater risks. To conclude, the estimated results suggest that in transition 
countries volatility increases with financial depth, but reduce as the efficiency of the financial market 
increases. 
Government actions do not seems to perform a "buffer" role, as fiscal shocks do not prove to be statistically 
significant. The greater volatility of government expenditure results in greater output volatility, but the effect 
is not significant. A potentially destabilizing effect of government expenditure volatility could indicate that 
greater deviation in government spending either reflects macroeconomic imbalances or that spending 
supports extravagant government behaviour rather than capital investment. 
We contribute to the literature on output volatility by reporting a finding that seems to be neglected in the 
previous discussion on a subject. Our finding indicates that the relationship between openness and export 
diversification on output volatility is related to the quality of institutions. When export is diversified, trade 
openness tends to increase output volatility. If the export is concentrated, trade reduces volatility. In both 
cases, weak institutions are more costly. Yet diversification has pervasive influence on the effect of openness 
on volatility, diversification on its own is beneficial for output stability.  
5. Robustness checks 
 
In order to investigate stability of our findings several robustness checks are obtained (Table 4 in the 
Appendix 4). The effect is estimated using different proxy for dependent variables such as 3 -year non-
overlapping standard deviation of gdp growth and 3 -year non-overlapping standard deviation of Hodrick–
Prescott (HP) filtered gdp growth, but the same qualitative and very similar quantitative findings are obtained 
in comparison to the preferred result (Column 1 in table 4 in Appendix 4).  Another check is obtained by 
using the whole range of different proxies for institutions. In addition to corruption, other WGI indices are 
used such rule of law, government effectiveness and political instability.  
 
We also estimate the model with institutional quality measure taken from Kaufmann et al. (2010), Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International and European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) market and trade institutional efficiency a part of a robustness check. From the later 
group, overall institutional index and indices that asses market and trade (index of price, forex and trade 
liberalisation and competition index). However, measures used for a robustness has high degree of simple 
correlation with Kaufman indicators (0.8 and 0.7, respectively).  Columns (2) to (7) in Table 5 presents the 
results with those institutional proxies along with other WGI indicators such as rule of law, government 
effectiveness and political instability. 
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Evidence emerging from all these alternative indexes covering several institutional dimensions is very 
similar to those resulting from the indicator used in proffered specification. The simple slope of openness at 
high/low combinations of moderator variables has the same intuition behind the results: effect of openness on 
output volatility is smaller when institutional environment is better, regardless of the level of export 
diversification.  
 
According to regional principle, we estimate model using data from Central and South Eastern Europe 
countries only. The evidence from CEB+ CIS sample aligns to evidence from transition sample. Yet we 
undertake investigation on sample of Commonwealth Independent States we do not consider those findings 
reliable due to small number of observation retained in a sample.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
We contribute to the literature on output volatility by reporting a finding that seems to be neglected in the 
previous discussion on a subject. Our analysis raises the questions of the importance of distinction between 
diversification at different export margins when investigate the effect of openness on volatility conditional on 
a level of diversification and re-examine the role of institutional quality for the effect of trade openness on 
output volatility.   
 
 
We find than the effect of openness is conditional on the export diversification only when export diversifies 
at the intensive margin (i.e. changes in distribution of export shares) is observed. The results show that the 
effect of openness on volatility reduces as country has more equal distribution of export shares across 
product exported. Such finding corresponds to the evidence found in the previous literature (Rodrik, 1998; 
Epifani and Gancia, 2009 and Haddad et al, 2013).   
 
However when diversification is measured at the extensive margin (i.e, when change in the number of export 
products), we find that trade openness, export diversification at the extensive margin and institutional quality 
jointly affect output volatility in transition countries. Analysis of marginal effect reveals that both, export 
structure and institutions, moderate the effect that exposure to trade has on output volatility. Openness has a 
pervasive effect for different levels of diversification, resulting in a greater stability of output if exports are 
concentrated on a few products and greater instability if country's export basket is fairly diversified.  When 
country has export basket concentrated on a few products, trade openness is significantly more beneficial 
when institutions are better. However,   when export basket is diversified, the effect of openness is similar in 
different institutional environment. Greater number of product in export basket appears to reduce output 
volatility, but having significantly more success in less open than in more open countries. Institutions do not 
play any significant role for the effect of diversification.  The results of our analysis provide the evidence that 
increasing number of export products is an effective strategy for output volatility reduction, especially in less 
open economies. Flipping the story from the angle of trade openness, we found that in transition countries 
more openness is beneficial only if country export a few products and have good institutions. Otherwise, 
when number of products increases, more openness may result in more volatility, especially when 
institutions are poor. Institutions do not appear as a prime mover of volatility, but it influences how the 
reaction of output to increasing trade.  
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Our results indicate that it is important to distinguish which export margin is measured by the indicator used 
in the analysis, as the openness will affect  volatility differently when  diversification is result of equality in  
distribution across existing products or; when diversification arise from  broadening the country’s export 
portfolio to new products. In the similar studies export diversification is measured by the concentration 
indices only. However, although diversification indices measures changes at the export shares (i.e. intensive 
margin), diversification calculated by the concentration indices is often interpreted as a change in number of 
export products, which is not conceptually correct. Our findings that the trade openness has different effect 
on volatility when country diversifies exports along the extensive that when export is diversified along the 
intensive margin show that differences between diversification at the export margins are not just conceptual, 
but also substantive.  
 
Evidence on the volatility-enhancing effect of openness when country increase the number of export products 
in transition economies  should be interpreted taking into consideration specificity of the economics in 
transition, which experience remarkable external and internal shocks in the beginning of the 90s. External 
shock results in major fundamental changes of their external trade, while internal shocks cause changes in the 
resource allocation and institutions.  Considering very short period of time from beginning of transition, we 
could expect that exporters are still finding right mode of their presence at the external markets. This is along 
the line with Besedes's (2011) findings on increased hazard of transition country's export that is a 
consequence of their increased participation in international trade. Moreover, Besedes (2011) find that hazard 
of exporting over time increased the most for differentiated goods and that mostly richer transition 
economies (such as Czech Republic or Slovenia) reoriented trade towards differentiated goods at expense  of 
the other type of goods. The richer economies in Besedes (2011) sample are the most diversified in our 
sample, which implies that churning could explain volatility-enhancing effect of openness in diversified 
countries. In addition, such evidence may indicate that too many different products may not form large, 
internationally competitive industries, which may reduce probability for domestic producer to successfully 
participate on the global market.  These new exporters are usually not the most efficient once, since in 
transition context, given limited opportunities at the home market, firms are pushed into export market. Also, 
these are small economies with limited potential to exploit economies of scale which may result in a high 
cost of moving into many new products (Papageorgiou and Spatafora, 2012). On the other hand, volatility-
reducing effect of openness when country is concentrated could be reflection of exporters with monopolistic 
competition and market power (Buch 2002).   
 
In order to investigate stability of our findings several robustness checks are obtained. We use different 
proxies for dependent variables, the whole range of different proxies for institutions and divide sample 
according to similar country groups.  However, the evidence emerging from all these alternative strategies is 
very similar to those resulting from the preferred specification. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Decomposition of Theil index to map into diversification at the export margins 
Empirical researches usually calculate product export diversification using the Theil index: 
𝐼 = 1
𝜕
∑ 𝑥𝜕
?̅?
𝐺𝑙 �
𝑥𝜕
?̅?
�𝜕𝑖=1                             (1.1.) 
where  ?̅? = ∑ 𝑥𝜕𝜕𝜕=1
𝜕
 is the average value of total exports. 
 
The index is inversely related to the degree of diversification: it is zero if exports are equally distributed 
among n export lines (i.e. perfect diversification)  and it achieves its maximum value, ln(n), and if all exports 
is concentrated in one export line, while the export in other lines is equal to 0 (i.e. perfect concentration). It is 
straightforward from 1.1. that higher n (the introduction of new export categories in a country’s export mix) 
lowers index and accordingly increase diversification, keeping all else constant. However, if new product is 
large enough, it can even increase concentration. Hence, in addition to number of export lines, diversification 
is determined by the equality of export values across export lines. Since this is not straightforward from 1.1., 
we make derivative of the Theil to show in which way distribution of export values affects value of index: 
  
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝑥1
≈
1
𝑙?̅?
ln �𝑥1
?̅?
�                             (1.2)  
 
       
Since ?̅? and n are always positive, sign of derivative (i.e. whether index will decrease or increase when 𝑥1 
increase for 1) depend on ln �𝑥1
?̅?
�: for x1 <  ?̅? , increase in 𝑥1  toward ?̅?  will decrease value of index (i.e. decrease concentration) and for x1 > ?̅?,   increase in 𝑥1  will incearase value of index (increase concentration). The export is more 
concentrate the more further is xi  from ?̅?,  and is more diversified the closer is xi  to ?̅?. In other words, the 
more evenly spread across a set of exported goods will increase diversification, indicated by decrease in the 
Theil index. 
The Theil index can be calculated for groups of individuals and decomposed additively into within-groups 
(Tw) and between-groups (Tb) components: 
 
𝐼𝑤 = ∑ 𝜕𝑗𝜕 ?̅?𝑗?̅? � 1𝜕𝑗 ∑ 𝑥𝜕?̅?𝑗 𝐺𝑙 �𝑥𝜕?̅?𝑗�𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝐽𝑖=1                                         (1.3.) 
 
𝐼𝑏 = ∑ 𝜕𝑗𝜕 ?̅?𝑗?̅? 𝐺𝑙 �?̅?𝑗?̅? �𝐽𝑖=1                                                            (1.4.) 
where 𝐼𝑤 + 𝐼𝑏  = T; 𝐺𝑖(𝑗 = 0, … 𝐽) is group of individuals (𝑖 = 1 …𝑙) , 𝑙𝑖 is the number of individuals in group j and ?̅?j is the 
group’s average value. 
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The decomposability property is considered to be the main advantage of Theil index over alternative 
measures of diversification. We follow Cadot et al. (2011) and use this property to measure diversification 
along the intensive and extensive margins of export growth.  
In order to construct these sub-indices, Cadot et al. (2011) differentiate the total number of potential export 
lines (n) (products classified according to the Harmonized System at the 6-digit level -HS6) into the group of 
lines for which positive export is recorded for that country and year   (group of traded export lines denoted 
by 𝐺1) and the groups of lines with no amount exported (group of non-traded lines denoted by 𝐺𝜕). 
Considering this partition, the between-group index is: 
 
𝐼𝑏 = 𝜕0𝜕 ?̅?0?̅? 𝐺𝑙 �?̅?0?̅? � + 𝜕1𝜕 ?̅?1?̅? 𝐺𝑙 �?̅?1?̅? �                          (1.5.) 
                                                            Non-traded         Traded 
In this case, the between component is not defined for non-traded categories as non-traded lines have no 
value ( 𝑥𝑖 = 0 for all i, then  ?̅?0 = 0 and accordingly logarithm in (1.8.) is not defined).  However, when 
H’Lopital’s rule is applied, the first addend in (1.8.) is equal to zero (1.9.). lim𝑥0→0 �∑ ?̅?𝑗?̅? 𝐺𝑙 �?̅?𝑗?̅? �𝐽𝑖=1 �=0                                     (1.6.) 
Accordingly, the between component is reduced to: lim𝑥0→0 𝐼𝑏 = 𝜕1𝜕 ?̅?1?̅? 𝐺𝑙 �?̅?1?̅? �                                          (1.7.) 
Considering the already established fact that the value of non-traded lines tends to zero and their means also 
tend to zero, it follows that ∑ 𝑥𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝜕𝑖=1𝑖𝑖𝐺1  . Since  ?̅? = ∑ 𝑥𝜕𝜕𝜕=1𝜕  and ?̅?1 = ∑ 𝑋𝜕𝑘𝑘𝐺1𝜕1   , it further follows that 
𝑙1?̅?1 → 𝑙?̅? and (1.10.) takes the form of: 
lim𝑥0→0 𝐼𝑏 = 𝐺𝑙 �?̅?1?̅? � = 𝐺𝑙 �∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺1𝑙1   ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑖=1
𝑙
� = 𝐺𝑙 � 𝜕
𝜕1
�             (1.8.) 
Total number of potential export lines within the current harmonized (SITC) system is time invariant. Then, 
if period-to-period change (△) in the index is observed, and the property of the log of a quotient is applied, 
the between components will reduce to  lim𝑥0→0 △ 𝐼𝑏 = −△ 𝐺𝑙 (𝑙1)                                       (1.9.) 
It means that change in the between component of the index measures changes in the number of traded 
export lines (n1), i.e. it reflects changes at the extensive margin of export growth. Since the natural logarithm 
is an increasing function, and diversification is related to the value of the Theil index (being greater at lower 
values), the introduction of new export categories is an indication of increased diversification at the extensive 
margin. 
The within-group component will take a form of: 
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𝐼𝑤 = 𝜕0𝜕 ?̅?0?̅? � 1𝜕0 ∑ 𝑥𝜕?̅?0 𝐺𝑙 �𝑥𝜕?̅?0�𝑘𝑖𝐺0 � + 𝜕1𝜕 ?̅?1?̅? � 1𝜕1 ∑ 𝑥𝜕?̅?1 𝐺𝑙 �𝑥𝜕?̅?1�𝑘𝑖𝐺1 �             (1.10.) 
 
                                                                Non-traded                            Traded 
The group-specific Theil index is in square brackets. If it is assumed that all export lines have the 
same arbitrary positive value 𝑥𝜕, so that 𝑥0 = ?̅?0, then ∑ 𝑥𝜕?̅? 𝐺𝑙 �𝑥𝜕?̅? �𝑖𝑖𝐺0 = 𝑙𝜕ln (1) which reduces the  
first addend in (1.9) to 𝜕0
𝜕
?̅?0
?̅?
𝐺𝑙(1) = 0. Consequently, the within component reduces to   lim𝑥0→0 𝐼𝑤 = 𝜕1𝜕 ?̅?1?̅? � 1𝜕1 ∑ 𝑥𝜕?̅?1 𝐺𝑙 �𝑥𝜕?̅?1�𝑘𝑖𝐺1 �                                       (1.11.)           
Equation 1.14 is the Within-Group Theil Index for Group 1. Considering the already proven identity that 
𝑙1?̅?1 → 𝑙?̅? when 𝑥0 → 0, it follows that the within component is equal to the Theil index for the Group 1 
traded export lines:  lim𝑥0→0 𝐼𝑤 = 1𝜕1 ∑ 𝑥𝜕?̅?1 𝐺𝑙 �𝑥𝜕?̅?1�𝑖𝑖𝐺1 = 𝐼1                                                  (1.12.) 
And changes in the within-group components are a measurement of the changes of concentration among 
traded lines only (△𝐼𝑤 =△ 𝐼1), by definition capturing changes at the intensive margin of export growth. Here, more even spread among the value of existing export lines is an indication of increased 
diversification.   
Change in the between component of the index reflects diversification at the extensive margin of export 
growth by measuring changes in the number of traded export lines, while changes in the within-group 
components reflects diversification at the intensive margin of export growth by measurement of the changes 
of concentration among traded lines only. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Description of data 
Table 1. Description of data 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variable  
Output volatility Standard deviation of the real GDP per capita growth rates 
 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators  
Independent 
variables 
  
Sources of shocks   
Terms of trade 
volatility 
Standard deviation of terms of trade. Terms of trade are constructed by 
dividing each year's export deflator by the import deflator. Deflators are 
measured as the ratio of current to constant local currency export/import.  
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
Inflation rate 
volatility  
Standard deviation of the annual percentage changes of average consumer 
prices. 
World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) 
Exchange rate 
volatility 
Standard deviation of exchange rate, annual average. European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), 
macroeconomic indicators 
Government 
expenditure volatility 
Standard deviation of the ratio of general government total expenditure 
(total expense and the net acquisition of nonfinancial assets) to GDP. 
World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) 
Mediators of shocks  
Export diversification Change in the between component of the Theil index, capturing 
changes in the number of export products.  
Author's own calculation using 
export data at the HS6-digit level 
from UNCTAD 
Trade openness The trade dependency ratio is the sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product. 
 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 
Financial openness An index of restrictions on cross-border transactions. 
The index includes capital flows and capital restrictions 
Chin and Ito (2008) 
Credit to private 
sector 
Financial resources provided to the private sector, such as 
loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other 
accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment.  
 
WB, World Development 
Indicators 
Institutional  quality  EBRD Institutional index European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), 
transition indicators 
Conflict Dummy variable, taking value of 1 in year of conflict Central Intelligence Agency 
Sample of countries Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania,  Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.  
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APPENDIX 3 
System GMM estimation results 
Table 2. System GMM estimation of the model (2) 
Dependent variable:  Standard deviation of the real GDP per capita growth rates   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES hhi gini theil intensive extensive 
      
Export diversification 28.63289** -76.19098 1.82284 3.14262 -5.74648 
 (11.431) (55.027) (5.462) (3.943) (3.869) 
Openness 0.15474* -0.84130 -0.05178 0.11737 -0.04285 
 (0.092) (0.547) (0.211) (0.168) (0.066) 
Institutions -1.64234 -4.79128* -7.37464 -1.27449 1.56176 
 (2.780) (2.635) (7.674) (3.868) (4.007) 
Export diversification#Openness -0.29929*** 0.88082 -0.00797 -0.03221 0.04384 
 (0.114) (0.613) (0.049) (0.038) (0.029) 
Terms of trade volatility -5.95654 -9.23460** -6.51961 -2.65100 -0.36528 
 (6.485) (4.420) (7.867) (5.066) (6.303) 
Exchange rate volatility 0.02505 0.01303 0.07587 0.01229 -0.00313 
 (0.090) (0.067) (0.094) (0.059) (0.088) 
Inflation rate volatility -0.00121 -0.00090 -0.00228 -0.00108 -0.00050 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Government expenditure volatility 0.00872*** 0.00697*** 0.00712 0.00802*** 0.00616*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Cred. to private/GDP 0.04839 0.05394** 0.09739 0.04119 -0.01874 
 (0.043) (0.027) (0.097) (0.056) (0.060) 
Financial openness 0.10186 0.48661 1.05052 0.23495 -0.28459 
 (0.486) (0.304) (1.219) (0.695) (0.586) 
Conflict 1.24511* 0.43787 0.77759 1.19052** 0.39068 
 (0.699) (0.630) (1.385) (0.543) (0.493) 
2bn.year -0.01842 -0.05610 1.34719 -0.29796 -1.25729 
 (1.210) (0.994) (2.815) (1.369) (1.264) 
3.year -0.97390 -1.05121 0.33982 -1.35758 -2.23464* 
 (1.071) (1.100) (2.897) (1.360) (1.176) 
4.year -1.01081 -1.11630 0.40860 -1.59764 -2.13082* 
 (1.019) (1.087) (3.142) (1.277) (1.111) 
5.year 2.59104** 2.93091*** 2.58051 2.28245 3.09820*** 
 (1.040) (1.076) (2.765) (1.433) (1.167) 
      
Constant -7.70952 89.32153* 20.26636 -5.31182 5.59276 
 (13.162) (51.966) (22.964) (18.304) (12.473) 
      
Observations 107 107 109 109 109 
Number of country 24 24 25 25 25 
Number of instruments 22 22 23 23 23 
Arellano-Bond test AR(1) -3.10 -2.8 -2.98 -3.32 -2.12 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.034) 
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Arellano-Bond test AR(2) 1.11 0.04 0.58 0.91 0.24 
 (0.266) (0.970) (0.564) (0.364) (0.812) 
Sargan test of overidentifying  
restrictions 
2.47 5.1 0.05 0.53 6.92 
 (0.872) (0.747) (0.977) (0.970) (0.227) 
Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions 
1.63 3.08 0.04 0.75 2.77 
 (0.950) (0.929) (0.979) (0.945) (0.735) 
Portion of variance explained by the 
components 
0.950 0.920 0.927 0.87 0.92 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy 
0.634 0.700 0.701 0.695 0.643 
 
Table 3. System GMM estimation of the model (1) 
 
Dependent variable:  Standard deviation of the real GDP per capita growth rates   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model 
      
Export diversification -5.51667 -25.75361 0.10855 -0.81854 -1.45991 
 (12.084) (25.363) (0.437) (0.526) (1.553) 
Openness -0.00480 -0.06718* -0.03244 -
0.06356*** 
-
0.08585** 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.032) (0.024) (0.040) 
c.Export diversification#c.Openness -0.40505 -0.54236 -0.06638** -0.05320 0.05771 
 (0.255) (0.738) (0.026) (0.035) (0.068) 
Institutions 0.38264 1.72512 -1.77381 2.10669 1.86560 
 (0.414) (2.122) (0.023) (0.037) (0.091) 
Institutions#Openness 0.01782 -0.00386 0.08214 -0.00008 -0.05068 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.059) (0.032) (0.072) 
Institutions#Diversification -11.23774 -2.03234 -1.27099 -0.57313 -1.54752 
 (1.785) (3.532) (2.980) (2.273) (3.940) 
Openness#Diversification#Institutions -0.15506 2.00769 0.02535 0.08060** 0.16511* 
 (27.629) (121.915) (1.555) (2.158) (4.036) 
Terms of trade volatility 4.98750 -3.68114 9.11467 3.91295 -4.10699 
 (7.646) (6.886) (8.887) (7.893) (7.154) 
Exchange rate volatility -0.01008 -0.01584 -0.06113 -0.01833 -0.01503 
 (0.057) (0.075) (0.050) (0.053) (0.098) 
Inflation rate volatility -0.00061 -0.00057 -0.00064 -0.00021 -0.00093 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Government expenditure volatility 0.00698*** 0.00796*** 0.00841*** 0.01167*** 0.00869** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Cred. to private/GDP 0.00135 0.02507 0.02265 0.01766 0.03069 
 (0.022) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) 
Financial openness  0.16774 0.01648 0.23467 -0.20615 -0.54745 
 (0.432) (0.460) (0.310) (0.498) (0.649) 
Conflict 1.04109** 0.91996 2.03174*** 1.66721** 1.13714 
 (0.487) (0.662) (0.725) (0.830) (0.859) 
2bn.year -0.67438 -0.55631 -0.13508 -0.30425 -0.90717 
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 (0.651) (1.509) (0.871) (0.876) (0.954) 
3.year -
2.06372*** 
-1.95165 -0.61560 -1.38411 -1.44134 
 (0.708) (2.224) (1.252) (1.250) (1.261) 
4.year -
1.88613*** 
-2.27545 -0.77606 -1.50157 -1.34217 
 (0.687) (2.040) (1.026) (1.211) (1.206) 
5.year 2.88274** 1.22361 3.82038** 2.11398 2.16675 
 (1.269) (2.246) (1.858) (1.794) (1.514) 
Constant 3.55863*** 2.98046* 2.06427 2.72099* 2.53889 
 (1.027) (1.537) (1.499) (1.567) (1.567) 
      
Observations 107 107 109 109 109 
Number of country 24 24 25 25 25 
Number of instruments 23 23 24 24 24. 
Arellano-Bond test AR(1) -3.07 -2.99 -2.07 -2.76 -2.46 
 (0.002 (0.003) (0.039) (0.006) (0.014) 
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) 1.68 0.16 0.51 0.53 0.09 
 (0.092) (0.875) (0.608) (0.595) (0.932) 
Sargan test of overidentifying  restrictions 3.29 4.39 2.78 2.89 6.14 
 (0.656) (0.496) (0.734) (0.716) (0.293) 
Hansen test of overidentifying  restrictions 3.98 4.29 2.74 2.72 6.30 
 (0.552) (0.508) (0.740) (0.744) (0.287) 
Portion of variance explained by the components 0.986 0.992 0.982 0.983 0.975 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy 
0.696 0.721 0.724 0.721 0.717 
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APPENDIX 4 
Robustness checks 
Table 4. Fixed effect robust estimation of model (1) for different institutional proxies 
 Diff. 
dependent  
Different institutional proxy CEB and SEE  
42 
 
Institutional 
proxy 
 
Control of 
corruption -
World Bank 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index-
Transparency 
international 
Control of 
corruption -
World Bank 
EBRD market 
and trade 
institutional 
efficiency 
Rule of law-
World Bank  
Government 
efficiency-
World Bank 
Political 
instability-
World Bank 
Control of 
corruption -
World Bank 
VARIABLES Col (1) Col (2) Col (3) Col (4) Col (5) Col (6)    Col (7) Col (8) 
         
Export 
diversification 
0.03673* 18.90780** -18.66102* -4.92105 9.97755** 9.82069** 10.34815** 19.42838*** 
 (0.019) (7.761) (10.164) (4.036) (4.121) (4.144) (4.191) (5.941) 
Openness 9.87808*** 0.20019*** 0.17012 0.18822** 0.03580* 0.04533** 0.04826** 0.08585** 
 (3.498) (0.057) (0.103) (0.075) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.034) 
Institutions 7.16038** 3.45746*** 3.66601 3.23965 5.89106** 3.54759 2.58158 11.52791** 
 (3.106) (1.170) (3.874) (2.671) (2.568) (2.863) (1.577) (4.212) 
Extensive# 
Openness 
-0.08868*** -0.19173** 0.13154* 0.02501 -0.08425** -0.07934** -0.08760*** -0.15309*** 
 (0.025) (0.075) (0.075) (0.043) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.037) 
Institutions# 
Openness 
-0.06286** -0.03670*** -0.02892 -0.03662* -0.04544** -0.03834 -0.03213** -0.12016** 
 (0.028) (0.011) (0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.015) (0.041) 
Institutions# 
Extensive 
-1.32833 -2.29471* 11.97201**
* 
10.00284*** -0.59087 1.05264 2.32324 -6.93308 
 (1.867) (1.131) (3.875) (2.478) (1.275) (2.087) (1.774) (5.151) 
Openness#Exten
sive#Institutions 
-0.01303 0.02590* -0.08575*** -0.06712*** -0.01315 -0.01540 -0.01768 0.05920 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.029) (0.022) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.062) 
Terms of trade 
volatility 
0.55476 -3.50180 -6.74715 -2.58770 -1.78744 -3.57356 -3.65094 19.49897*** 
 (4.347) (6.204) (5.001) (4.013) (6.049) (4.925) (5.657) (5.281) 
Exchange rate 
volatility 
-0.00168** -0.00131* -0.00198* -0.00087 -0.00266** -0.00154 -0.00201** -0.00036 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation rate 
volatility 
0.00931*** 0.00915*** 0.00740*** 0.00502** 0.00956*** 0.00792*** 0.00785*** 0.00650*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Government 
expenditure 
volatility 
0.04007 0.04619 0.02430 0.02313 0.04411 0.03285 0.02697 0.02933 
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.049) (0.047) (0.041) (0.045) (0.048) (0.042) 
Cred. to 
private/GDP 
0.05096*** 0.04476*** 0.04412*** 0.03727*** 0.04958*** 0.04604*** 0.05198*** 0.06649*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Financial 
openness  
-0.00020 -0.00053 0.00017 0.00161 -0.00034 0.00059 0.00086 0.00019 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Banking reform 
index 
-1.39469* -1.56198** -1.73356** -1.44306** -2.12274* -1.65524 -1.98684* -1.49728 
 (0.815) (0.685) (0.653) (0.679) (1.049) (1.085) (1.064) (1.195) 
2.year  -1.57363** -3.00850** -2.51605** -1.49016* -1.53633* -1.39485* -0.73600 
 -1.19117 (0.691) (1.156) (0.998) (0.850) (0.865) (0.792) (1.218) 
3.year (0.850) -2.42247*** -3.92146*** -3.36979*** -2.14508*** -2.32318*** -2.26116*** -1.66413* 
 -1.90473*** (0.585) (1.346) (1.115) (0.652) (0.664) (0.635) (0.869) 
4.year (0.658) -2.25656*** -3.84787** -3.29518** -1.73582*** -2.10049*** -2.18539*** -1.80826 
 -1.94144*** (0.498) (1.427) (1.304) (0.564) (0.592) (0.568) (1.455) 
5.year (0.514) 2.09512** 0.02713 0.46695 2.40521** 2.05003** 1.76765* 1.68501 
 2.12806** (0.927) (1.694) (1.546) (0.914) (0.917) (0.971) (1.057) 
 (0.867)        
         
Constant 0.95574 -12.81296** -13.38853 -13.48530* 3.26488 1.17119 2.16000 -6.39713 
 (4.052) (5.749) (11.571) (7.421) (4.293) (4.595) (4.222) (6.379) 
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             Robust standard errors in parentheses; for diagnostic tests, p-values 
               *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Observations 107 102 106 106 107 107 107 61 
R-squared 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.85 
Number of 
country 
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 14 
Adj. R-squared 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.79 
         
Wooldridge test 
for 
autocorrelation 
in panel data 
0.965 0.749 0.103 0.033 0.769 1.581 0.560 1.149 
 (0.3361) ( 0.3976) ( 0.7512) ( 0.8565) (0.3895) (0.2213) (0.4620) (0.3032) 
Wald test for 
groupwisehetero
skedasticity  
1.3e+31 14621.48 214.98 517.32 548.73 1150.19 517.32 14621.48 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
